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The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery,
Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners
Marc M. Arkin*
Federal habeas corpus petitions allow state prisoners to collaterally attack a state court
conviction on the ground that the conviction is constitutionally infirm. Whether federal courts
should fully review state court determinations of constitutional claims or whether they should
be limited to only those instances in which the state forum did not provide an adequate hearing
of the federal claims is an issue of some debate. Those engaged in the debate who rely on
historical sources to prove their point generally rely on the same body of literature. This
Article argues that a large portion of this literature does not address collateral review of state
court convictions. In its early stages, habeas corpus petitions were brought in state court by
individuals detained by federal authorities for military enlistment. In the state courts, habeas
questions concerned whether a court could hear evidence to contradict a detaining authority's
petition prior to conviction. Later, in the federal courts, the same issues which existed in the
state courts arose, only this time the detainees were federal officers in pursuit offugitive slaves.
The Article concludes that given the history of habeas corpus, debates over the extent of
collateral review should remain in the twentieth century.
[The founders were right all along, but ... the results are a lot funnier
than they intended.
MOLLY IVINS, NOTHIN' BUT GOOD TIMES AHEAD xi (1993)
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Jill E. Fisch, Abner Greene, Robert Kaczorowski, Michael M. Martin, Henry P.
Monaghan, Daniel Richman, William Treanor, Lloyd L. Weinreb, and Larry W. Yackle for
their helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article. I also wish to thank the Fordham
University School of Law for its research grant in support of this project.
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Irony is the stuff of history.
Take, for example, the debate over federal habeas corpus relief
for state prisoners. Those favoring full review of state court decisions
have staked out the moral high ground, proclaiming that every federal
right deserves a federal remedy dispensed by a federal forum.' They
leave to their opponents the dubious honor of championing the so-
called "institutional competence model,"2 a position that advocates
limiting federal review to situations in which the state has failed to
provide an adequate hearing for the federal claim-and that hardly has
the ring of Magna Charta to it. Both sides have skirmished for years
over the length of their respective historical pedigrees, with one side
suggesting that habeas "relitigation" of state judgments is a novelty
known only to the waning days of the twentieth century,3 while the
other claims that common-law habeas courts routinely set aside final
judgments from the inception of the republic and before.4
1. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 422 (1963) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
('The State court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration and what
procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional
right."), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5-24 (1988); Gary Peller, In Defense
of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 583 (1982); Larry
W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991,999 n.24 (1985).
2. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441, 523-28 (1963). According to Professor Ann Woolhandler,
who herself is engaged in an effort to "demodel" the habeas corpus debate, "this model is
also referred to as a 'corrective process' model, because it assumes that federal habeas
should be available only 'if the state itself failed to provide adequate process to correct the
constitutional violation."' Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 575,
577 n.12 (1993) (quoting Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REv. 247,
277 (1988)); cf. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CI. L. RE. 142, 160 (1970) (arguing that a state prisoner must make a
colorable showing of innocence as a prerequisite to federal collateral review of a state
criminal conviction).
In fact, the taxonomy of habeas corpus has become a legal discipline in itself. See, e.g.,
Friedman, supra, at 277 (identifying more than two models); Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories
of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 151-56 (1994); Kathleen Patchel, The
New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 943 (1991) (arguing that Friendly and Bator jointly
provided the intellectual basis for recent Supreme Court decisions restricting habeas corpus
review); cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv.
1141, 1146 (1988) (arguing that different approaches to the history of habeas corpus reflect
different approaches to federalism).
3. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 2, at 505 (observing that federal relitigation of the
final decisions of state courts was all but unknown prior to the Supreme Court's 1953
decision in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)).
4. See, e.g., Peller, supra note 1, at 612 (arguing that lower federal court decisions
revealed habeas corpus as a broad remedy for the vindication of constitutional rights and
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Some commentators have pointed out that both parties to this
historical debate rely for support on essentially the same limited body
of case law. This would be a fine irony if it were absolutely accurate.
But, in fact, the institutional competence people quote Supreme Court
precedent6 while the full review people quote lower court precedent
and, for the most part, the two pass like the proverbial ships in the
night.
8
The true irony instead comes from a different source-the nature
of the early habeas cases themselves. For, if either side had looked
closely at the lower court decisions generally thought to establish
broad federal review of state criminal judgments,9 it would have
found, not simply that the evidence was more equivocal than
advocates have argued-that result might be expected-but, that all
the cases were on the wrong side. The cases routinely cited in the
modem literature as precedent for a full-review approach to habeas
corpus before the Civil War arose when the federal government issued
writs of habeas corpus to release slaveholders and federal marshals
values from the inception of the republic). Revisionist histories of habeas corpus include
James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next 7me?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1997, 1998-99 (1992) (claiming that
habeas corpus existed in parity with direct review and as a substitute for it); Woolhandler,
supra note 2, at 587-629.
5. See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 2, at 580.
6. See Bator, supra note 2, at 463-74.
7. Peller, supra note 1, at 612. Peller contends that the true picture of historical
habeas practice does not appear in Supreme Court opinions, which were distorted by the
Court's lack of appellate jurisdiction, but in the lower court decisions that Bator ignored. It
should be noted, however, that Peller's position suffers from a fundamental weakness.
Before the late nineteenth century, lower federal courts had nearly the same appellate
jurisdiction-or lack thereof-as the Supreme Court in criminal matters. See, e.g., ALFRED
CONKING, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION, AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS
OFTHE UNITED STATES 51-71 (1864) ("As to writs of Habeas Corpus, it is proper to observe
that the principles settled in the decisions ... treating of the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court are applicable also to the Circuit Courts.").
8. Peller explicitly criticizes Bator's historical analysis on the ground that Bator
limited his reading to Supreme Court decisions and omitted any discussion of lower federal
court precedent. Peller, supra note 1, at 612.
9. Historians, legal and otherwise, have certainly considered these cases, but the
historical context has largely escaped the legal writers studying the writ of habeas corpus
itself. As an example, Robert M. Cover discussed many of these cases in detail in his
enormously influential book, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
185-91 (1976). His focus, however, was not on the innovations in habeas practice, but,
rather, on the behavior of the judges whose courts were invoked on behalf of the
slaveholders. Part of the aim of this Article is to bring together these two separate strands of
inquiry.
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jailed by state governments for their efforts to recapture the
slaveholders' fugitive property. ° These decisions, now cited for their
fidelity to individual rights, overturned official state actions aimed at
helping the runaway slaves. Not only that, but the decisions were
rendered by northern federal judges, some of whom were opponents of
slavery.
Were this not irony enough, the most florid language extolling the
value of habeas corpus arose in cases that did not involve review of
final state judgments. In fact, many of them did not even review the
legality of the detention, for the simple reason that the Lincoln
administration already had suspended the privilege of habeas corpus. 1
Even had the writ had been available, most of these rhetorically
stirring cases involved petitions by disunionists complaining of
executive detentions without trial by the federal government.12
As other scholars have noted, habeas corpus is best understood as
a dynamic institution, continually expanding, particularly in the
nineteenth century.13 Its growth in America arose from the traditional
sources of habeas expansion: the judiciary guarding its own
prerogatives and coordinate branches of government jockeying for
power.14 But, unlike the English experience, which largely focused on
the contest between the Crown and the rest of the government, 5 the
American experience added a new twist: federalism. In that most
vexed period in American history, the decades leading up to the Civil
War, the writ of habeas corpus served as the stalking horse for the
larger issues in the tug of war between the states and the federal
government.
6
In fact, the debate over relitigation is largely miscast. The
campaign for extended habeas powers was not fought over collateral
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Part VI.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. Woolhandler, supra note 2, at 580 (contending that "[v]iewing habeas corpus in
the broader context of judicial review of official action ... produces a dynamic, rather than
static, model of habeas"); cf. WILLAM F DUKER, A CONSTrUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAs
CoRpus 309 (1980) (suggesting that the entire historic tendency of habeas corpus is toward
expansion of the writ).
14. See, e.g., 9 W.S. HoLDswORm, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 223-26 (3d ed.
1926); Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. RE. 1038, 1045-55
(1970).
15. 9 HOLnswoRm, supra note 14, at 227-28.
16. See, e.g., Peller, supra note 1, at 616-18.
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review of the final decisions of courts of competent jurisdiction; such
review did not appear until after the state-federal problems created by
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.17 Instead, it was fought out over a
more subtle form of disrespect: Whether the habeas court could hear
evidence intended to contradict the version of the facts in the detaining
authority's answer to the petition, whether that authority be a sheriff,
marshal, army officer, or a fugitive slave commissioner. To the
antebellum lawyer, this was a significant innovation and a significant
assertion of power over another sovereign.
The assertion of jurisdiction to challenge the return began in the
state courts as they extended their common-law habeas jurisdiction to
federal detainees claiming to be victims of military enlistment fraud.
The move to assert jurisdiction gathered momentum as antislavery
forces urged greater evidentiary powers in state habeas proceedings in
order to test the truth of a slaveholder's claim of title to the person
detained. And, it reached the federal courts, first in imitation of the
state courts, and then, in the struggle over enforcement of the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850, as a weapon to impose federal policy on
recalcitrant free states opposed to the law. It is here, in these federal
cases, that the theme of irony emerges at its fullest.
The story played out in the lower courts is a good one, until now
unnoticed, and perhaps a little complex. This Article is an effort to tell
that story and, in the process, to clear some brush about the history of
habeas corpus and American federalism.18 It is also about irony: No
one has exclusive claim to the moral high ground. Not only that, but
the moral high ground itself is frequently built on quicksand.
I. ANTEBELLUM HABEAS CORPUS LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A
(BRIEF) NUTSHELL
In the early nineteenth century, if a lawyer had inquired about the
workings of habeas corpus in American courts, he would have been
17. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
18. For example, the received wisdom is that it was not until the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment that the federal government assumed the role of the protector of
individual liberties against the states. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1484, 1501 (1987). However, active
federal intervention on behalf of individual property rights-against state efforts to regulate
those rights-before the Civil War seems, at least, to introduce the possibility of a more
nuanced account of the development of federalism. See Larry Kramer, Toward a Theory of
Federalism, or Back to the Future (preliminary draft on file with author).
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told that the Great Writ was the legal mechanism by which a person
could test-and seek release from-an allegedly illegal detention,
whether public or private. 9 He would also have been told that the
federal constitution protected against the suspension of the writ except
in times of dire national emergency,2 that state constitutions contained
similar guarantees,2' that both staten and federal courts routinely
issued the writ, and that their practice was largely determined by the
common law and tradition.23
In fact, the term "habeas practice" covers three related questions:
to whom did a court's power to issue the writ extend; under what
circumstances could a court issue a writ; and what procedures
19. See generally DUKER, supra note 13, at 156; Developments in the Law: Federal
Habeas Corpus, supra note 14 (discussing, among other things, the history of habeas
corpus). For an example of a federal habeas petition directed at a private custody, see the
rather bizarre case of Exparte Des Rochers, 7 F. Cas. 537 (C.C.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 3824)
(attempting to obtain federal habeas corpus relief for a judge kidnapped by private persons
to prevent him from performing his judicial duties).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."). For further background regarding the suspension clause, see Francis Paschal,
The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605. Mark E. Neely, Jr. points out,
citing Milton Cantor, that the writ of habeas corpus is the only common-law process named
in the Constitution, an indication of its importance to the Framers. MARK E. NEELY, JR., TIE
FATE OF LIBERTY ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVLLIBERTIES xiv (1991).
21. For a discussion of state constitutional guarantees of the availability of habeas
corpus, see Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States: 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
243, 249-51 (1965). Federal law further assured that the writ would extend to newly
acquired territory. See, e.g., Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, § 14, 2 Stat. 743, 747 ('The people
of the said territory [Missouri] shall always be entitled to ... the benefit of the writ of
habeas corpus."); Act of Feb. 20, 1811, ch. 21, § 3, 2 Stat. 641, 642 (Louisiana's
government "shall secure to the citizen ... the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
conformably to the provisions of the constitution of the United States."); Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, Act of July 23, 1787, § 2, recodified in Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1
Stat. 50, 52 ('"he inhabitants of the said territory, shall always be entitled to the benefits of
the writ of habeas corpus .... ).
22. See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 21, at 255.
23. See, e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 19, at 84 (1981)
(noting that early federal decisions "steered a conservative course, roughly following the
English habeas practice"); Milton Cantor, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: Early American
Origins and Developments, in FREEDOM AND REFORM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HENRY STEELE
COMMAGER 55-78 (Harold M. Hyman & Leonard W. Levy eds., 1967) (observing that
habeas practice was derived from tradition, trial-and-error usage, and compromise
arrangements rather than statutory mandates). Benjamin V. Abbott, author of a nineteenth-
century treatise, states that the federal habeas corpus acts before 1867 "were almost silent
upon procedure" and thus "left the courts to follow the common law practice or form one for
themselves." 2 BENJAMIN V. ABBOI, A TREATISE UPON THE UNITED STATES COURTS, AND
THEIR PRACtiCE 209 (1871).
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governed the formal steps in the process of examining the legality of a
detention. In the early years of the republic, the answer to the first
question depended on whether a state or federal court was involved,
but the answers to the second and third were the same, no matter
where the petitioner filed the application for a writ.24
The reason for the different answer to the "who" of habeas
practice rested on the different sources of habeas jurisdiction in the
state and federal systems. At the very beginning of the nineteenth
century, most state courts continued to draw their authority to issue the
writ from their common-law powers which preceded independence.'
Accordingly, state courts answered all three questions based on the
common law. Codification of habeas powers did not become a
significant factor in the states until somewhat later in the century.26
And, as the state courts came to understand their role, the common law
told them to issue the writ of habeas corpus to any prisoner claiming a
colorably illegal detention.27
The federal courts, on the other hand, were courts of limited
jurisdiction and required legislative authorization in order to exercise
habeas jurisdiction.2 8 The first of these enabling statutes was the
24. See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 23, § 16, at 73 (the nature of the federal and state
writ was substantially the same).
25. See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 21, at 251 (observing that only South Carolina had a
habeas corpus act at the time of independence); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most
Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U. L. REv. 143, 146 (1952) (stating that
all colonial charters were silent about habeas corpus).
26. See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 21, at 251-52. Oaks expresses surprise that state
lawmakers "apparently had no sense of urgency about enacting habeas corpus legislation."
Id. at 251. Only South Carolina, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia had acts by 1787; Delaware and New Jersey followed in the 1790s. The remaining
states straggled in, Maryland in 1809, New Hampshire in 1815, Connecticut in 1821, Rhode
Island in 1822, and North Carolina in 1836. With the exception of Connecticut, the acts
were modeled on the English Act of 1679, which was so limited that state courts continued
to rely on their residual common-law powers. 14 at 252-55.
27. Paschal argues that "the Constitution's habeas corpus clause is a directive to all
superior courts of record, state as well as federal, to make the habeas privilege routinely
available." Paschal, supra note 20, at 607. He bases this conclusion, in part, on the fact that
the Constitution did not require the creation of the lower federal courts, although by
implication, it did require that habeas corpus be made available. Id. at 616-17; cf
Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 14, at 1267 ("A purposive
analysis [of the suspension clause], then, supports a constitutional requirement that there be
some court with habeas jurisdiction over federal prisoners.").
28. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807). In Bollman, Chief Justice
Marshall held that congressional authorization was necessary to confer habeas jurisdiction
TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1
Judiciary Act of 1789,29 which granted federal judges the power to
issue writs of habeas corpus. The Act, however, contained a
significant limitation, reflecting the balance of power between state
and federal interests at the time: Federal courts could only issue the
writ on behalf of persons in jail if they were in federal custody.30
Congress supplemented this grant of habeas jurisdiction twice
during the antebellum period, each time reaching a little further into
state prerogatives. The first extension took place in 1833, during the
Nullification Crisis. When South Carolina threatened to imprison
federal marshals who enforced the federal "tariff of abominations,"
Congress granted federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas
corpus to persons in state custody because of acts performed pursuant
to federal law or federal court process.31
Nine years later, in 1842, New York attempted to try a British
national for murder, despite diplomatic protests that the homicide took
place during hostilities between the United States and Great Britain,
on the federal courts but that Congress had a constitutional "obligation" to make the writ
available. Id.
29. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
30. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 82, provided:
[E]ither of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district
courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of commitment.-Provided, That writs of habeas corpus
shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody,
under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial
before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
31. The Force Act, Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7,4 Stat. 632, 634-35, provided in
pertinent part:
That either of the justices of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any district
court of the United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by law,
shall have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner or
prisoners, in jail or confinement, where he or they shall be committed or confined
on, or by any authority or law, for any act done, or omitted to be done, in
pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree, of any
judge or court thereof, any thing in any act of Congress to the contrary
notwithstanding. And if any person or persons to whom such writ of habeas
corpus may be directed, shall refuse to obey the same, or shall neglect or refuse to
make return, or shall make a false return thereto, in addition to the remedies
already given by law, he or they shall be deemed and taken to be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction before any court of competent jurisdiction,
be punished by fine, not exceeding one thousand dollars, and by imprisonment,
not exceeding six months, or by either, according to the nature and aggravation of
the case.
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and that, therefore, the trial violated the law of nations.32 In response,
Congress again extended federal habeas jurisdiction. This time,
Congress granted federal courts the power to issue the writ of habeas
corpus to another group of state prisoners: foreign nationals who
claimed that their incarceration was the result of actions performed
under the authority of a foreign nation and governed by international
law.33 The first federal habeas act reflected the importance of state
power at the time of the framing; each successive act extended
national power over the states in order to protect a necessary federal
function from state encroachments.34
If the preceding discussion begins to answer the "who" of habeas
law, the "what" and "how" are a bit harder to pin down. In the
Supreme Court's leading-and profoundly opaque-statement
regarding the habeas corpus provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
Chief Justice Marshall held that, except for the limitation to federal
32. People v. McCleod, 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. 1841); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SuPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 98 (1947). McCleod crossed the Niagara River
at night with an armed band and destroyed the steamboat Caroline, moored on the American
side. An American citizen was killed in the incident. New York courts rejected McCleod's
claim that his acts were done under the authority of the Canadian-that is, British-
government. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 310 n.a (1844).
33. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539, 539. This act gives to the justices of
the Supreme Court and the district judges the power to:
grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners in jail
or confinement, where he, she, or they, being subjects or citizens of a foreign
State, and domiciled therein, shall be committed or confined, or in custody, under
or by any authority or law, or process founded thereon, of the United States, or of
any one of them, for or on account of any act done or omitted under any alleged
right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or claimed under
the commission, or order, or sanction, of any foreign State or Sovereignty, the
validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations, or under color
thereof.
34. Most modem commentators assume that the 1833 and 1842 acts did not enlarge
the types of custody embraced by the writ, but simply extended existing federal practice to a
new group, a limited class of persons in state custody. E.g., Note, The Freedom Writ-The
Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HARv. L. REv. 657, 659 (1948). Case law,
discussed in Part V below, does not bear out this view.
It should also be noted that not until 1867 did federal courts receive the power to grant
habeas to state prisoners "in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." Act of
Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 385, 385. But see Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of
1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 31, 37 (1965) (arguing
that the 1867 Act was solely intended to be an enforcement device for the Thirteenth
Amendment).
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prisoners, the writ was governed by the common law.35 This appeared
to place state and federal practice on an equal footing, but it still left
open the question of exactly what the common law said. The answer
to that question is further complicated by the fact that practice was
relatively fluid, varying in details from state to state and court to court.
Thus, a broad outline of common-law practice is all that can be fairly
given.
According to a standard antebellum reference work,36 in criminal
matters, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction under the 1789 Act-
paralleling common-law and state practice--extended only to pretrial
detentions.37 Federal courts would not issue the writ to a prisoner
already convicted or serving a sentence imposed by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The reason generally given for this limitation
was that, at the time, federal courts did not enjoy appellate powers in
criminal cases.38 But it is also clear that this restriction preserved
English practice under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,39 which had, in
turn, worked its way into colonial courts. As a matter of fact, the issue
of postjudgment remedies was unlikely to have arisen because
35. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-95 (1807); see Exparte Dorr, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 103, 104-05 (1845).
36. Rou N C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE CONNECrED wrI IT. WrrH A VIEW OF THE
LAW OF EXTRADrON OF FUGrrivEs (1858). Hurd's testimony on this point is all the more
important because he was an antislavery activist whose political agenda dictated an
extremely expansive reading of precedents governing the writ.
37. Id. at 338; see also YACKLE, supra note 23, at 84-85 ('The writ issued in behalf
of prisoners attacking executive detention, but generally was not available to challenge
detention by court order after conviction. The only exception was in the case of conviction
by a court that lacked jurisdiction."); Oaks, supra note 21, at 262-63 (authorities compiled
therein).
38. E.g., CONKUJNG, supra note 7, at 35, 85.
39. 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (1679). That Act, passed in reaction to Crown and judicial
abuses of the common-law writ, contained a variety of procedural reforms. Its provisions,
however, applied only to persons detained for criminal matters, and even as to those, its
benefits were not available to persons committed to prison for felonies or treason or "to
persons convict or in execution by legal process." Id. § 3. These persons had their remedy,
if any, in the surviving common-law writ of habeas corpus. WLIAM S. CHURCH, A
TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 31 (2d ed. 1893). But there is no evidence that
the scope of the writ was any greater in criminal cases under common-law practice in the
United States. E.g., Oaks, supra note 21, at 262. The 1679 Act maintained the common-
law practice that the habeas court could not go behind a facially sufficient return. 9
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 14, at 119.
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incarceration was not routinely imposed as a means of postconviction
punishment for criminal acts until the nineteenth century.'
The key to understanding the practical workings of this limitation
on habeas relief in criminal cases rests in the phrase "court of
competent jurisdiction." Although a writ was unavailable to challenge
ordinary errors in the trial or sentencing process, it could be used to
challenge errors that, if corrected, would deprive the trial or sentencing
court of jurisdiction. For example, if a court martial, a body whose
jurisdiction extended only to military personnel, tried and sentenced a
civilian, the prisoner could challenge his detention in a habeas
proceeding by claiming the court lacked jurisdiction over him. The
invitation to creative advocacy was obvious: Lawyers attempted to
convince the court that every error or defect was jurisdictional in
nature. This, in turn, led to a great deal of what modem readers find to
be fairly obscure talk about void and voidable judgments. To translate
into modem terms, if ajudgment was beyond the court's jurisdiction, it
was void and could be challenged collaterally in habeas corpus; if the
error did not go to jurisdiction, the judgment was merely voidable and
the prisoner was limited to appellate remedies, if any existed.4
The "how"-the procedures governing habeas corpus
applications-followed a general pattern inherited from English
practice.42 The detainee, known as the "petitioner," or another person
acting on the prisoner's behalf, generally called the "relator,"'43
presented a petition to the court in the form of an affidavit or other
sworn document demonstrating a prima facie case of illegal detention.
If satisfied by the showing, and convinced that this was a situation in
40. See, e.g., J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 416-24
(2d ed. 1979); George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison Retold, 104 YALE L.J. 1235, 1239
(1995). Before the 1830s, conviction of a crime ordinarily ended incarceration in the United
States and punishment was largely noncustodial in nature. See, e.g., DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEw REPUBUC 57-109
(1971).
41. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 13 F. Cas. 867, 868 (C.C.D. Mich. 1842) (No.
7418), discussed infra note 95.
42. The following account of habeas procedure is largely drawn from HURD, supra
note 36, at 211-213, 225, 231,239, 243-62.
43. The "relator" is an informer or the person upon whose information a writ is
issued and who stands in the position of the plaintiff in a proceeding. BLACK'S LAw
DICIONARY 1289 (6th ed. 1990).
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which it had jurisdiction to act,44 the court would then issue a writ of
habeas corpus directed to the person with custody of the petitioner.
The writ itself simply commanded the custodian to bring his charge
before the judicial authority-("habeas corpus" roughly translates as "we
want to have the body here in our courtroom ' 45) and to state the
reasons that the petitioner was being held.
46
The custodian set forth the reasons for the detention in a
document called the "return." The return was subject to a number of
formal requirements: it had to display, among other things, the time
and cause of the prisoner's "caption," the cause of detention, and
whether the custodian would produce the detainee before the court or
provide a good excuse for failing to do so.4' In cases of arrest on
judicial process, the warrant, and frequently affidavits in support of the
government's version of the facts, were also attached to the jailer's
return."
The habeas court then was able to hold a hearing to consider the
adequacy of the retum.49 The focus of the hearing was, for obvious
reasons, the custodian's justification for continuing to detain the
petitioner.5 If the reasons set forth by the custodian were not legally
sufficient to justify the restraint, the court would order the prisoner
released, or, if circumstances warranted, admitted to bail instead.5'
But, at least in common-law practice as Americans inherited it
from England,52 courts were bound by the version of the facts stated in
44. HuRD, supra note 36, at 225. For example, if a federal court found that the
prisoner was in state custody, it would refuse to issue the writ on the ground that it lacked
jurisdiction to act.
45. Id. at 232.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 239.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Courts also considered the adequacy of the other components of the return,
such as the cause for caption (the modem equivalent would be probable cause to arrest) or
the propriety of the custodian's refusal to produce the prisoner. Id at 256, 303. According
to Hurd, courts tended to pay little att ntion to the former, but were skeptical of the latter
and would take evidence on the validity of the proffered excuse if necessary. Id. at 243-62.
51. Id. at 271-72. Hurd stressed that at common law, habeas corpus was not a means
of avoiding trial on the merits before a jury, but rather a remedy to obtain speedy bail before
the trial of bailable offenses. Id. at 271-77; c. United States v. Lawrence, 26 F Cas. 887
(C.C.D.C. 1835) (No. 15,577) (refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus to admit to bail a
petitioner detained for assault on President Andrew Jackson so that the petitioner might
demonstrate his mental incapacity and the court might discharge him to the proper restraint).
52. E.g., Damel's Case, 3 Cobbett's St. Tr. 1, 1-2 (K.B. 1627).
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the return and were unable to accept extrinsic evidence to controvert
the jailer's response.53  The judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction, a facially sufficient arrest warrant showing probable
cause, and an affidavit swearing that the party held was a slave-all
these legally justified the restraint and were not subject to any but the
most limited challenges. The few permissible challenges were
analogous to the modern-day affirmative defense, for the prisoner was
allowed to "confess and avoid" the facts stated in the return.54 For
example, if a return showed that a prisoner was legally detained on
civil process, he might, by affidavit, show that he was privileged from
arrest in some way.5
The reasons for this rule of finality are not entirely clear, although
in stressing the limited fact-finding capabilities of the court, they may
well reflect the appellate aspect of habeas corpus. The courts' refusal
to accept direct challenges to sworn statements of coordinate
authorities may also demonstrate respect for the competence of those
authorities within its own sphere. In any event, the rule of evidentiary
finality began to change both in England 6 and the United States
during the early decades of the nineteenth century, as courts began to
assume greater fact-finding powers in habeas proceedings. The
American Law Register, writing in 1856, summarized the
developments of the preceding four decades this way:
On general principles, and by common law, the return was
absolutely conclusive, could not be in any way controverted or pleaded
against, and the relator was left to his action for a false return; this
strict rule, however, had some relaxations, parties being allowed to
confess and avoid the return, though not to controvert it; and the courts
refusing to consider themselves bound by a manifestly false return
though as to what should be the test of falsehood in a return, there was
not perfect agreement.
The inconvenience of the doctrine became so great as to require and
obtain the interposition of the legislature both in England, and
probably, all of the United States; and under the provisions of the
53. See, e.g., HURD, supra note 36, at 263-77.
54. Id. at 270.
55. Id.
56. In 1816, by statute, Parliament gave English courts the power to test the validity
oftheretum. 56 Geo. 3, ch. 100 (1816).
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statutes so enacted, the truth of the facts stated in the return may,
generally, be controverted and investigated. 7
The first half of this Article describes the erosion of the rule of
evidentiary finality in the early decades of the nineteenth century under
the pressure of military abuses, a development that took place first in
the state courts and then in the federal system.58  In admitting
challenges to the truthfulness of a detaining authority, courts not only
found themselves possessed of enhanced powers, they also
participated in a lowering of the barriers between previously separate
repositories of power in society. In that way, the change in the
treatment of the return paved the way for the irony that forms the
subject of the second half of this Article. The growth of habeas
evidentiary powers prepared the federal judiciary to overturn final
judgments of state courts in the interest of federal supremacy as
embodied in the habeas provisions of the 1833 Force Act.59 The
federal courts, thus, laid the groundwork for federal collateral review
of state criminal convictions to protect federal rights in cases in which
the federal rights enforced were those of slaveholders in their human
property, an irony as profound as any in American history.
KI. THE ENuSTMENT CASES: STATE Courrs EXPAND THEIR PowERs
OF INQUIRY IN HABEAS CORPUS
The serious expansion of habeas corpus in the United States can
be said to begin with the military build-up preceding the War of
57. Remarks on the Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum and the Practice
Connected Therewith, in 4 THE AMERCAN LAW REGISTE 257, 268-70 & 268 n.1 (1856)
(citations omitted). The same authority continued, describing developments by mid-century:
The conclusiveness of the judgment or sentence of a court or officer of competent
jurisdiction is, however, in no Way affected by opening the questions of fact to
investigation; the rule, it is submitted, being that while all the facts, and probably
the law, passed upon or decided by the judgment or sentence in question are
forever and conclusively put to rest thereby, except under process in the nature of
appeal all other facts alleged in the return, and indeed the existence of that
judgment or sentence, are fully open to contradiction and disproof.
Id. at 269.
58. See, e.g., HuRD, supra note 36, at 283-92 (compiling state statutory authority
and case law permitting courts to go behind the return and asserting that, by the mid-
nineteenth century, a number of states explicitly permitted their courts to inquire into the
veracity of the return).
59. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634.
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1812.60 The federal government paid bounties to enlistment brokers
for each new recruit secured. Predictably, the number of fraudulently
induced enlistments was quite high. When the new recruits came to
their senses-or their parents or guardians located them-they
petitioned for habeas corpus on the ground that they were wrongfully
detained by the military authorities.61
These petitions primarily came before the state courts. In part,
this forum choice seems to reflect the obvious: There were more state
than federal courts and state courts were more geographically
convenient. But, it is also tempting to speculate that petitioners
believed themselves more likely to obtain a sympathetic hearing for
their claims in their nearby state courts than in federal courts which
were, after all, agents of the detaining government.62
The complicating issue was whether, in the newly established
federal system, state courts had the authority to issue writs of habeas
corpus to federal officers and, more important, to order them to release
60. In 1807, tensions from French and British efforts to control shipping during the
Napoleonic Wars reached a critical level. The British navy boarded the United States
frigate, Chesapeake, fired three broadsides into her when her captain refused to permit a
search, and then impressed three American sailors and one British deserter into the Royal
navy. Thereafter, from 1807 to 1809, the American government attempted to enforce an
embargo on foreign trade in order to bring the English government to terms. SAMUEL ELIOT
MoRisoN ET AL., A CONCISE HISTORY OFTHE AMERICAN REPUBuC 156-59 (2d. ed. 1983).
61. The majority of enlistment cases went unreported so that the issue-and
fraudulent enlistment-was more widespread than the frequency of published cases
indicates. E.g., Sims's Case, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285, 309 (1851) (noting that issuance of
habeas corpus "is constantly done, in cases of soldiers and sailors, held by military and naval
officers, under enlistments complained of as illegal and void"); cf In re Reynolds, 20 F. Cas.
592, 595 (N.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 11,721) ("During my own service as judge in a state court, I
exercised the power of discharging minors held under invalid enlistments in repeated
instances.... In most of these instances not even a newspaper notice of the case was ever
published."). Although these cases are a little late to serve as direct evidence of
underreporting during the War of 1812, there is no reason to assume that the dynamic
changed during the antebellum period.
62. Supporting this suggestion that state residents tended to favor their own courts is
the fact that one of the few early federal enlistment cases, Wilson v. Izard, 30 F. Cas. 131
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1815) (No. 17,810), involved English nationals who had no home court to
petition. The English nationals had enrolled in the United States army for the purposes of
defending New York. They unsuccessfully argued that they were entitled to discharge from
the army on the grounds that (1) they were enemy aliens, (2) they had enlisted to defend a
particular place, and (3) they had enlisted to serve under a particular officer who no longer
commanded them. American courts did not, in practice, draw careful or explicit distinctions
between executive and judicial detentions, so that patterns initially established in the review
of executive detentions spilled over into review of judicial detentions. See Woolhandler,
supra note 2, at 590-93.
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persons in federal custody.63 At the very start of the military build-up,
state courts were deferential to federal prerogatives and generally
found that they lacked jurisdiction to interfere in what were essentially
federal criminal offenses of enlistment fraud.64 Thus, in 1812, New
York's Chancellor Kent, faced with a petition involving enlistment
abuse, reluctantly declined to act. He characterized the difficulty as a
lack of state-court jurisdiction over a federal matter: "If the soldier, in
the present case, be detained against his will, knowing him to be an
infant, or if, though an adult, he has been compelled to enlist, by
duress, or violence, it is a public offence, but an offence of which this
court cannot take cognisance.' '65 Indeed, even if a state court had
issued the writ on behalf of a federal detainee, it was still bound to
accept the federal officers' response as conclusive on the legality of the
custody.6
6
As the abuses mounted, however, state courts overcame their
jurisdictional-and, subsequently, their evidentiary-reservations. For
example, no less an authority than Chancellor Kent reversed his
position on the jurisdictional issue within the space of a year. In the
case In re Ferguson, Kent's jurisdictional misgivings had caused the
New York court to refrain from issuing the writ on behalf of the
enlistee, although the other justices had not voted with him.67 One
year later, in In re Stacy, Kent changed his mind and wrote an opinion
that freed an individual held by federal military authorities for
treason."
63. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
64. E.g., In re Ferguson, 9 Johns. 239, 240 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1812). In Ferguson,
Chancellor Kent discussed the case of Emmanuel Roberts, 2 Hall's Law J. 192 (Md. 1809),
observing that
habeas corpus was awarded ... upon affidavit that the person had been
seized and forcibly carried on board of a public vessel, belonging to the United
States, then lying in the harbor of Baltimore, and where he was detained. By the
return of the writ, it appeared that Roberts had voluntarily enlisted in the naval
service of the United States; and the court declared it to be a proceeding under the
authority of the United States, and that they had no right to interfere, although it
was alleged, that the party was only sixteen years of age and was drunk when
enlisted.
Ferguson, 9 Johns. at 239-40.
65. Id. at 240.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 239-42.
68. 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
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Although Kent's decision in Stacy was based on a finding that the
charge was not on oath and the military court lacked authority to try
the offense-a lack of jurisdiction in the court martial-the case
established that state courts could, indeed, reach out to federal
prisoners and command federal officers to obey state-court process.
The Chancellor's revised view that state courts could issue the writ to
federal detainees found its way into his enormously influential
Commentaries on American Law and established itself among
American courts.69
The state judiciary's assertion of authority to release federal
prisoners weighed powerfully in the ongoing tug of war between state
and federal spheres of authority. In order to make that assertion
meaningful, however, state judges had to expand the issues that could
be tried in the habeas proceeding. As discussed earlier, under the
received common-law rule, a prisoner could not introduce any
evidence to contradict the version of the facts in the return. Thus, the
military offered a conclusive and sufficient return to a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of a soldier by showing that he was held
under a regular enlistment. The habeas court could not challenge the
statement, much less consider additional evidence, to decide whether
the detention was, in fact, legal.
Widespread enlistment fraud, however, made courts skeptical of
returns presented by federal officials. In England, by the middle of the
eighteenth century, some judges had begun to suggest that they had the
right to disregard an openly and manifestly false return, although as a
matter of actual practice, they rarely exercised the power.70 It seems as
if, faced with patent abuse of citizen rights, American state courts
came to the same conclusion; they began to engage in extensive fact-
finding in military cases in aid of their underlying habeas jurisdiction
69. Despite the obvious differences, Kent described Stacy as "a similar case" to
Ferguson in his Commentaries on American Law, and wrote approvingly of state courts
issuing writs of habeas corpus on behalf of federal detainees. KENT, supra note 32, at 400.
Thereafter, the practice seems to have been unanimously established in the state courts. Id.
The New York Supreme Court later unanimously affirmed its right to discharge a minor who
had enlisted in the army without parental consent by pretending that he was twenty-one. In
re Carlton, 7 Cow. 471,471-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); cf In re Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 592, 595
(N.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 11,721) (stating that, "During my own service as judge in a state
court, I exercised the power of discharging minors held under invalid enlistments in repeated
instances, and without the jurisdiction being questioned; and I well know that the same
authority was frequently exercised by other state courts and judges.").
70. HURD, supra note 36, at 264-66.
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to reach illegal detentions.71 State-court refusal to accept the
statements of federal officers at face value, in turn, posed a significant
challenge to federal powers.72 Although the early cases are scattered
and underreported, the pattern that emerges supports this reading.
Take, for example, a pair of unrelated cases heard by
Massachusetts state courts in 1814, at the height of hostilities with the
British. The first, Commonwealth v. Cushing, involved William Bull,
who had enlisted and then deserted the army.73 Bull was captured and
brought before a general court martial, where he admitted his guilt.74
While in custody under sentence of the military court, Bull petitioned
for a state writ of habeas corpus. The Massachusetts court granted the
writ and subsequently discharged Bull after finding that his enlistment
was void because he was under age when he joined the army.75 In
doing so, the court narrowly construed the federal enlistment statute,
holding that minors without guardians were not subject to enlistment
at all and that the resulting contract was, at the least, voidable at the
minor's request.76
The court's jurisdictional reasoning is not articulated. Nowhere
does the court justify its authority to discharge a federal detainee;
rather, it simply listed a series of cases at the end of the opinion,
including Ferguson and In re Roberts, both of which had actually
denied discharge to an enlistee on jurisdictional grounds. Perhaps the
key to the decision is its citation to Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,77 a case
that considered the respective spheres of authority of state and federal
71. The courts did so on the basis of their inherent common-law powers.
Legislation formally empowering courts to scrutinize the return in evidentiary hearings did
not generally appear until later in the century. See, e.g., id. at 285.
72. See, e.g., In re Roberts, 2 Hall's Law J. 192 (Md. 1809). In In re Roberts, the
state court issued the writ but held it had no right to interfere once the federal officers
presented a return stating that Roberts had voluntarily joined the navy, even though Roberts
presented an affidavit swearing that he had been underage and drunk when he enlisted. See
In re Ferguson, 9 Johns. 239, 239-40 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1812) (discussing In re Roberts).
73. 11 Mass. 67, 67 (1814).
74. An extract of the record of the court martial was appended to the return
presented by General Cushing. Id.
75. Id. at 71.
76. Id.
77. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). The citation to Martin was added after the Court
handed down the actual decision in Cushing, while Cushing was being prepared for
publication, because Martin was decided two years after Cushing. This enhances its
significance for understanding the basis of the decision.
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courts and established that both were authoritative interpreters of
federal law.
As to the underlying merits of the petition, the Massachusetts
court apparently found that the military court lacked jurisdiction to try
Bull because, due to the invalid enlistment, he remained a civilian.78
The reasoning of Cushing raises a number of interesting points. First,
in order to make this finding, the Massachusetts court accepted Bull's
affidavit avowing that he was a minor when he enlisted. The affidavit
thus contradicted the return in suggesting that the enlistment was
invalid and was contrary to both factual and legal matters already
determined by the federal court martial. Second, the Massachusetts
court implicitly asserted its authority to reconsider the jurisdiction of a
federal tribunal, albeit one of limited jurisdiction, finding that the
military court was not the conclusive arbiter of its own jurisdiction.
This, too, was a significant assertion of state authority over federal
interests.
In the second case, Commonwealth v. Harrison, the
Massachusetts court granted a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
master whose minor apprentice-a foreign national-had enlisted in
the army without the master's consent.79 In Harrison, government
counsel relied on Ferguson and argued that the state court was without
jurisdiction to consider a petition on behalf of a federal prisoner.80 The
Massachusetts court simply brushed the objection aside, baldly
asserting, 'This Court has authority-and it will not shun the exercise
of it on proper occasions-to inquire into the circumstances under
which any person brought before them by writ of habeas corpus is
confined or restrained of his liberty. 81
The court flatly held that federal laws prohibited the enlistment of
minors into the army without the consent of parents or guardians; a
foreign minor was within the prohibition; the enlistment was therefore
78. Opinion differed whether a wrongful enlistment was a good defense to desertion.
For example, in In re Reynolds, the court stated, "'There would be an end of all safety if a
minor could insinuate himself into an army, and after having perhaps jeoparded [sic] its very
existence, by betraying its secrets to the enemy, escape military punishment by claiming...
infancy."' 20 F. Cas. 592, 609 (N.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 11,721) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Gamble, 11 Serg. & Rawle 93 (Pa. 1824)). Cf. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1 Serg. &
Rawle 353, 355 (Pa. 1815) (holding that there was no restraint reachable by habeas corpus
when the minor enlistee affirmed that he wished to remain in the army).
79. 11 Mass. 63, 66 (1814).
80. Id. at 63.
81. Id. at65.
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"unjustifiable" and "void"; and the government "has no authority to
detain" the minor.8 2 The disputed factual issue in the case was whether
the detainee was actually a minor, since he had sworn that he was
twenty-one in his enlistment papers. To resolve this, the court held a
plenary hearing, and as a result of its own fact finding, found the
apprentice to be visibly underage. 3 In accepting evidence outside the
facially sufficient return, the Massachusetts court placed its distaste for
federal abuses ahead of the received limitations on its habeas powers.
By the late 1840s, the United States was again at war, 4 and the
expansionary dynamic associated with wartime habeas corpus was
again triggered. There is limited, but suggestive, evidence that faced
with military abuses, state courts even reconsidered the final decisions
of other state courts within their own system, eroding the strong rule
against challenging the final decision of a court of competent
jurisdiction. Thus, in a Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth ex rel.
Webster v. Fox, which involved the military enlistment of a minor
without parental consent, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
examined the final decision of a lower Pennsylvania court of
apparently competent jurisdiction.85 The minor enlisted, deserted, and
then surrendered. A Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas found him
subject to penalties for desertion. 6  His father then petitioned the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
82. Id.
83. Id. The detainee, George Ribkin, was an apprentice seaman on a Russian vessel
anchored in Boston harbor. He enlisted in the United States army under an assumed name,
stating that he was twenty-one. The court rejected the live testimony of the master on the
grounds that he was the applicant, but decided the case on other proof presented to it, as well
as on the demeanor evidence of Ribkin himself, who was obviously underage. Id. at 64; cf.
Commonwealth v. Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227, 232 (1836) (ordering that a minor be
discharged from the navy and restored to the custody of his guardian).
84. Following a protracted period of diplomatic maneuvering, the United States
went to war with Mexico in 1846. The war ended with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
signed early in 1848, paving the way for the annexation of California. JAMES M.
MCPHERSON, BATrtE CRY OF FREEDOM: THm Civi. WAR ERA 47-77 (1988) (discussing the
significance of the Mexican War in bringing on the Civil War); MORiSON Er AL, supra note
60, at 243-44.
85. 7 Barr. 336, 339 (Pa. 1847).
86. Id. at 336 ("The return stated, that the prisoner had enlisted in the army of the
United States, had deserted, and surrendered himself; and the matter had been decided by
the Court of Common Pleas. It was proved that the prisoner was the minor son of the
relator, who had never assented to the enlistment."). Nowhere does the record indicate why
a Pennsylvania state court was engaged in deciding whether a federal prisoner was liable for
desertion, although that may provide an alternative unarticulated explanation for the
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Based on its own fact-finding hearing, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held the enlistment void under federal law, therefore finding the
desertion immaterial and the restraint unauthorized.87 In issuing its
decision, the state court ignored the earlier inconsistent Common Pleas
decision, although counsel had argued that the lower court decision
was binding and final.88 Instead, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
announced,
This is in accordance with the principles of the common law, by the
provisions of which the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is the
prerogative of the citizen; the safeguard of his person, and the security
of liberty-no matter where or how the chains of his captivity were
forged--the power of the judiciary in this state is adequate to crumble
them to dust, if an individual is deprived of his liberty contrary to the
law of the land.89
The court thus construed its common-law habeas jurisdiction as
entailing all necessary powers to reach any illegal detention
whatsoever, whether state or federal, whether already decided or not.
The language is remarkably strong-it suggests that the common-law
writ was a check on government power, tapping into an almost mythic
conception of citizen liberties embodied in the phrase "law of the
land."9
Webster may well be a sport, decided during an unpopular war,91
at a time when sentiment against the federal government ran high. On
the other hand, it illustrates the potent expansive force of habeas
Supreme Court's decision. That is to say, the Court of Common Pleas may have lacked
jurisdiction over the offense. It is also possible that the Common Pleas's decision was based
on a petition for habeas corpus, in which case ordinary rules of res judicata would not apply.
If that were the case, however, one might expect the court simply to have said so.
87. Id. at 339.
88. The reporter's note shows counsel arguing that "[t]he previous hearing should
have been considered binding; since all the courts have equal jurisdiction, and no appeal is
given.... " Id. at 337. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, did not discuss this
argument at all.
89. Id. at 338.
90. It is suggestive that such language appears at a time when the so-called higher
law doctrine was beginning to circulate among antislavery activists. See, e.g., Wfl.AM
HOSMER, THE HIGHER LAW IN ITS RELATION TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT: WITH PARTIcuLAR
REFERENCE TO SLAVERY AND THE FUGITVE SLAVE LAW v-vi (1852). Certainly, there is an
escalation in rhetoric as the successive sectional crises and resistance to territorial expansion
took a toll on ordinary legal discourse.
91. The war with Mexico was extremely unpopular outside the Mississippi Valley.
The Whigs opposed the war and antislavery people generally viewed it as part of the slave
power's expansionist efforts. See, e.g., HENRY D. THOREAU, CIViLDISOBEDIENCE (1847).
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corpus when judges took seriously the writ's power to reach illegal
detentions, no matter what the detaining authority. By mid-century,
armed with this understanding of their prerogatives, state habeas courts
were accustomed to issuing the writ to federal prisoners and to taking
facts that contradicted the military's return in order to determine the
legality of a petitioner's enlistment.92 The next step in this story shows
the pattern of enhanced evidentiary powers beginning to spill over into
the federal courts, as they too began to erode the traditional limitations
on habeas procedure in aid of their underlying jurisdiction.93
II. FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus UNDER THE JUDICIARY Acr OF 1789
Until 1850, it appears that all reported federal habeas cases arose
under the habeas provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789.94 As a result,
federal habeas relief was restricted to federal detainees and was subject
to the traditional common-law limitations. In particular, courts would
not entertain petitions to reconsider the final decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction.95 At the same time, however, the traditional
92. In one mid-century decision on behalf of a father challenging the enlistment of
his son, the court took evidence that the son had enlisted at Berwick, Maine, while underage
and was subsequently stationed in New York. State v. Dimmick, 12 N.H. 194, 195 (1841).
The petitioner argued that the enlistment was void and therefore incapable of ratification, but
the court found that the son had ratified the contract by staying in the service for more than a
year after he came of age, and accordingly, was not entitled to discharge. Id. at 199-200; see
State v. Brearly, 5 NJ.L. 653, 662 (1819). Similar issues arose in cases involving the
question of whether a master had the right to continued custody of a minor apprentice.
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 6 Mass. 273, 273 (1810); In re M'Dowle, 8 Johns. 328, 328
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
93. See, e.g., In re Keeler, 14 F. Cas. 173 (D. Ark. 1843) (No. 7637). This was a
petition by a father on behalf of a minor son enlisted in the army. The court first held that,
under the 1789 Act, it must look to the common law to ascertain the substantive content of
habeas corpus. Id. at 174. The court then declared, "It is in the nature of a writ of error to
examine the legality of the commitment." Id. Since underage enlistment was illegal, the
court proceeded to determine the facts underlying the parental claim. Id.
94. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
95. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 13 . Cas. 867, 868 (C.C.D. Mich. 1842) (No.
7418). In Johnson, the petitioner argued that he was convicted under an indictment that
showed that the charged offense occurred more than two years before the date the grand jury
indicted him, violating the then-existing statute of limitations for federal crimes. This
defect, he argued, rendered the proceedings "null and void, and not merely erroneous,"
entitling him to release. Id. The court refused to grant relief because there was "no want of
jurisdiction in this case." Id. Instead, as the court pointed out, habeas corpus was not the
proper forum for such objections:
[I]f there was a bar under the statute, it should have been pleaded. No such
plea was interposed, and the question is, whether the objection can be raised on a
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common-law limitation that prevented a federal habeas court from
accepting evidence to contradict a facially sufficient return had
weakened significantly.
Although the data is rather ambiguous, the federal cases that
extended the habeas court's evidentiary power apparently involved
petitions directed at state power9 6 or executive misconduct in the form
of military or agency acts.97 Presumably, federal courts -were less
inclined to extend their evidentiary powers in cases challenging federal
judicial detentions because they paid greater deference to judgments of
sister courts.98 Moreover, into the l850s99 and even the 1860s and
beyond,1°° federal courts remained notoriously divided on whether the
1789 Act permitted them to pierce the factual and legal conclusions
embodied in the return to a writ of habeas corpus.
In 1833, Chief Justice John Marshall himself, sitting on circuit
with District Judge Barbour, illustrated the potential for a broader use
of the court's evidentiary powers in a habeas case involving an
writ of habeas corpus .... By failing to set up the defence, the defendant waived
it. And if this were not the legal effect of failing to set up the statute, it is clear
that on the habeas corpus, the court cannot look behind the sentence of the court,
where the jurisdiction is undoubted.
Id.
96. Because the 1789 Act restricted the federal court's habeas power to federal
detainees, cases presenting state misconduct were rare. However, the issue did arise in
extradition cases when prisoners were held in federal facilities on warrants issued by state
authorities.
97. Cf. Woolhandler, supra note 2, at 580 (noting that the scope of habeas corpus
review in the nineteenth century reflected the Supreme Court's willingness to address
random acts of "official illegality").
98. In part, this reflects the existing belief during the early republic that a federal
court was the final arbiter of its own jurisdiction. See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale
of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 257, 289-92 (1990) (suggesting that, in the
early years of the republic, the Supreme Court's interpretation of full faith and credit did not
permit inquiry in a sister court's jurisdiction for any reason).
99. Remarks on the Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum and the Practice
Connected Therewith, supra note 57, at 268-69 n.1.
100. E.g., In re Leary, 15 F. Cas. 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 8162) (holding that
when a prisoner petitioning for habeas corpus is held under a warrant for extradition reciting
that it was issued on the requisition of the governor of another state, the warrant is
conclusive, but the question whether the prisoner is the same person named in the
indictment attached to the warrant is always open to question); In re Clark, 5 . Cas. 833,
833-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 2797) (stating that when the indictment is presented in the
return, the habeas court "must" look into the indictment, but it "must be considered
sufficient, unless it be so defective in its material averments that it would be the manifest
duty of a court before which it was presented by a grand jury to decline to take action upon
it").
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executive detention. In Exparte Randolph, a case pled under the 1789
Act, Chief Justice Marshall issued the writ and, after considering the
petition and return, discharged the petitioner, Robert B. Randolph,
from federal custody.'0 ' The case arose when a federal marshal
arrested Randolph on a warrant issued by the solicitor of the treasury, a
procedure authorized by an act of Congress intended to aid in the final
settlement of public accounts maintained by military personnel."0 2
Randolph's counsel argued, among other things, that the act
under which he was arrested was unconstitutional because it violated
both the separation of powers and the Eighth Amendment.'0 3 In
response, the government maintained that the claim of
unconstitutionality was beyond the scope of a habeas proceeding
because
the court upon the return of a habeas corpus, will not look into the
regularity of the proceedings upon which a judgment is founded, in
pursuance of which, a party is taken into custody; but that they will
only inquire, whether a sufficient probable cause existed, to warrant
the commitment, and that in a case of this sort, they have not the
powers of a court of error.1°4
The government claimed that the return presented a facially adequate
reason for the incarceration and was, therefore, conclusive. According
to the government, a habeas court could not pierce the return to
reconsider issues determined in the warrant proceeding that yielded the
"judgment" upon which Randolph was arrested.
The government failed to persuade the court. Even before
counsel ventured his argument, the judges had received extrinsic
evidence in the form of supplementary exhibits and records, although
the material did not figure in the final decision.'0 5 Instead, Chief
Justice Marshall found the constitutional issue to be within the scope
of the habeas proceeding because it went to the lawful authority of the
101. 20 F.Cas. 242, 242 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 245. Counsel contended that the act violated the Eighth Amendment
because it permitted life imprisonment for a public debt without possibility of clemency. Id.
(citing the reporter's account of the remarks of Randolph's counsel, Mr. Robertson, former
attorney general of Virginia). But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976-78 (1991)
(Scalia, J.) (arguing that the Framers did not intend the ban on cruel and unusual punishment
to extend to terms of years).
104. Randolph, 20 F. Cas. at 250 (containing the reporter's account of the argument
of Mr. Nicholas, who appeared on behalf of the United States at the request of the court).
105. Id. at 244, 247 (presenting the reporter's description of the proceedings).
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treasury official to issue the arrest warrant. °6  If the act were
unconstitutional, then the warrant was void, and Randolph was entitled
to release:
[F]irst and most important [the question is whether] the act of
congress, under the authority of which it is issued, is repugnant to the
constitution of the United States. If this objection be sustained, the
warrant can certainly convey no authority to the officer who has
executed it, and the imprisonment of Mr. Randolph is unlawful. 107
Although Chief Justice Marshall expressed doubts about the act's
constitutionality, he held that it could be saved by a narrow
construction that excluded Randolph himself from its reach. 0 8 In
ordering Randolph's release, the Chief Justice concluded, "[T]his
warrant has been issued in a case which the law does not authorize; in
a case which ought to have been submitted to a court ofjustice. ' 9
The government framed the dispositive issue in Randolph as the
impropriety of relitigating the legal conclusions embodied in a facially
valid warrant.1 Instead, the court reached beyond the warrant to
106. Id. at 254.
107. Ik- at 253.
108. Id. at 255-56.
109. Id. at 257. Chief Justice Marshall then said, "On both these points I am of
opinion, that the agent of the treasury has exceeded the authority given by law, and
consequently that the imprisonment is illegal." Id.
Without elaborating his reasoning, the Chief Justice agreed with the separate opinion of
Judge Barbour that habeas corpus would lie in cases of civil commitment because the use of
the writ in the United States was not confined to the provisions of the Act of 1679, but also
included common-law practices. Id. Because Randolph's incarceration appeared to be
imprisonment for debt, the remainder of Judge Barbour's opinion seems to treat the matter
as if it were an imprisonment after a final judgment. Id. at 251. To this extent, it illustrates
that antebellum sources frequently called any decision that issued in process a judgment.
Judge Barbour stated that it was improper for a habeas court to consider whether there were
errors in the audit of Randolph's account, remarking that "sitting as we are, upon a habeas
corpus, the question is not, whether there is error in the proceedings, but, whether there was
jurisdiction of the case in the auditor of the treasury." Iat at 251. Barbour continued,
[A] habeas corpus will not lie, where the imprisonment is under voidable
process, but only where it is merely void; for void process is the same thing as if
there were none at all; and then the party is in effect imprisoned, without any
authority whatever. Hence, the question would seem naturally to arise, whether
the auditor had jurisdiction in the case-in other words, whether the person and
the subject matter are such as to bring the case within the provisions of the act of
congress-for these are the criteria of jurisdiction.
hi
110. Judge Barbour's analysis of the jurisdictional questions in terms of void and
voidable judgments supports the argument that the reach of habeas corpus was connected
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consider the constitutionality of the underlying statute. Disregarding
the finality of the return in order to inquire into the jurisdiction of the
detaining authority,"' the court perhaps took a small step, but one that
demonstrated a willingness to hear whatever issues were necessary to
determine whether a challenged restraint was beyond the bounds of the
law. An aggressive reading of Randolph might go further and point
out that a federal court under the 1789 Act reconsidered the decision of
a coordinate branch of government embodied in an apparently
sufficient and regular return that justified the prisoner's detention.
Written a decade later,11 2 Exparte Smith, an 1843 case arising out
of an extradition proceeding between Illinois and Missouri, gives some
indication of the direction of this growth." 3 Federal authorities had
custody of the Mormon leader, Joseph Smith, while he was awaiting
extradition from Illinois on a Missouri charge of being an accessory
before the fact to an assault with intent to kill. Smith petitioned for
federal habeas corpus under the 1789 Act and then attempted, in
response to the government's return, to prove that he had an alibi for
the time the attack occurred. The Illinois attorney general argued that,
at least in extradition cases, courts could not take evidence to
with the court's limited powers of revision of trial court judgments. Id. at 251. On the other
hand, had Randolph been able to obtain a trial, he likely would have been entitled to a writ
of error on the legal question if the court were willing to construe it as a civil matter.
Perhaps Robert's inability to obtain a trial coupled with the possible appealability of a civil
judgment explains Chief Justice Marshall's decision.
111. Cf. Woolhandler, supra note 2, at 588-93 (arguing that the courts had greater
discretion to consider "jurisdictional" matters when the defendant was incarcerated on the
authority of a court of limited jurisdiction rather than a court of general jurisdiction).
112. A few federal cases before the 1840s seem to assert the power to consider issues
behind and outside the return in proceedings involving state charges. For example, the 1825
case of Ex parte Bennett contains quite forceful language to that effect, even if the result is
rather mundane. 3 F. Cas. 204 (C.C.D.C. 1825) (No. 1311). Bennett was arrested in the
District of Columbia on a charge stemming from a New York theft. He was then released
and later arrested on a District of Columbia theft charge. When Bennett petitioned for
habeas corpus, the circuit court found that the first discharge was proper because of an
irregularity in the warrant. Id. at 204. It then announced that, even if the commitment on
the second charge were regular on its face, "the court can and will rehear the case and revise
his judgment." Id. This is particularly interesting because it shows that contemporary
sources continued to use the term "judgment" to describe nonfinal decisions by other courts,
illuminating the reluctance of habeas courts to unsettle those "judgments." These comments
have created some confusion in the recent literature. E.g., Liebman, supra note 4, at 2059
n.354 (describing Exparte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835), as involving double
jeopardy when, in fact, it only concerned pretrial proceedings denominated "judgments").
113. 22 F Cas. 373, 374 (C.C.D. Ili. 1843) (No. 12,968). Federal law governed
interstate rendition of fugitives. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 302, 302.
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contradict the return. Conversely, Smith's counsel contended that the
prisoner had every right "even to go behind the return and contradict
it.'
14
Curiously, the opinion reads as though the court believed the
government to argue that habeas corpus could not be used to "review
the acts of an executive functionary," such as a governor. 5 The case,
thus, assumed the rare posture of a federal petition aimed at an abuse
of power by a state executive.'1 6 The court implied in dictum that, if
necessary, it would have accepted Smith's alibi evidence in direct
contradiction of the return.' 1
7
As matters turned out, it was able to avoid reaching the issue.
Instead, the court found numerous factual and procedural deficiencies
in the record, dismissing a primary supporting affidavit as inherently
incredible.1 8 Rather than accept the state's version of the facts, the
court concluded that the factual basis of the charges was insufficient to
support the detention, much less the extradition." 9
The most significant assertion of federal power to pierce the
return occurred later in the century, during the Civil War, when federal
courts faced the same military-abuse cases previously heard primarily
in the state courts. This shift in the federal docket resulted from the
Supreme Court's 1859 decision in Ableman v. Booth, which held that
state courts could not issue writs of habeas corpus to federal
114. Smith, 22 F. Cas. at 375.
115. Id.at377.
116. Id. ("In supporting the second point, the attorney general seemed to urge that
there was greater sanctity in a warrant issued by the governor, than by an inferior officer.
The court cannot assent to this distinction. This is a government of laws, which prescribes a
rule of action, as obligatory upon the governor as upon the most obscure officer. The
character and purposes of the habeas corpus are greatly misunderstood by those who
suppose that it does not review the acts of an executive functionary. All who are familiar
with English history, must know that it was extorted from an arbitrary monarch, and that it
was hailed as a second magna charta, and that it was to protect the subject from arbitrary
imprisonment by the king and his minions, which brought into existence that great
palladium of liberty in the latter part of the reign of Charles II.").
117. Id.
118. Id. at379.
119. Id. ('The court can alone regard the facts set forth in the affidavit of Boggs, as
having any legal existence. The mis-recitals and overstatements in the requisition and
warrant, are not supported by oath, and cannot be received as evidence to deprive a citizen
of his liberty, and transport him to a foreign state for trial. For these reasons, Smith must be
discharged.").
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prisoners. 20 Although a fuller discussion of Booth is reserved for
later, at present it is worth remarking that the decision had the effect
of channeling more enlistment cases into the federal courts, not
because of any change in the underlying habeas law, but simply
because petitioners had nowhere else to go.
In these military abuse cases, the federal judiciary explicitly
looked to the developments in state evidentiary practice. On occasion,
federal courts even voiced opposition to Booth on the ground that state
courts were better able to protect citizens from military fraud because
of the state courts' firmly established powers to contradict a sufficient
return. Even federal courts that had previously resisted expansion of
their evidentiary powers felt pressure in the absence of state habeas
relief to exercise broader habeas powers themselves, at least in cases
that petitioners previously would have brought to a state form.
22
Perhaps the most interesting, if extreme, example of this situation
is the 1867 case of In re Reynolds, in which a New York federal
district judge explicitly considered the issues raised by Booth in light
of the disparity between federal and state habeas powers.'23 The
120. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). Booth is generally construed as holding that the
state courts did not have the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus to federal prisoners so
long as the federal writ was available to them. E.g., PAUL BATOR ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER'S, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 427-28 (2d ed. 1973). Not
until Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 410 (1872), however, did the Supreme Court
conclusively determine that the state courts were unable to grant the writ to federal
detainees.
121. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Seavey v. Seymour, 21 E Cas. 947, 950 (C.C.D. Me. 1871) (No.
12,596) (rejecting the government's argument that the age shown on the certificate of
enlistment was a conclusive return to a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that "[w]here
the recruit is less than eighteen years of age, and was mustered into the military service
without the consent of his parent, guardian, or master, proof to show that fact has always
been admissible in evidence"); Exparte Schmeid, 21 F. Cas. 702, 702 (C.C.D. Iowa 1871)
(No. 12,461) (stating that "[t]he validity of the enlistment of a person into the military
service of the United States may be inquired into on habeas corpus by a United States
judge"); In re Ferrens, 8 F Cas. 1158, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1869) (No. 4746) (conducting an
extensive hearing on a wife's challenge to her husband's enlistment on the ground that the
oath of enlistment was invalid); cf United States ex reL Murphy v. Porter, 27 F Cas. 599,
602 (D.D.C. 1861) (No. 16,074a) (denying writ to minor enlistee in the union army on the
ground that President Lincoln had suspended the privilege of habeas corpus in the district).
123. 20 F Cas. 592, 592 (N.D.N.Y 1867) (No. 11,721). It is significant that the
district judge in this case was formerly a state judge who had regularly issued writs of
habeas corpus to federal prisoners in enlistment cases. Id. at 595. It is also noteworthy that
none of the parties treated Booth as conclusive authority on the issue of state habeas powers
and that their knowledge of the case was rather shaky.
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factual background reads just like that of many of the earlier state-
enlistment cases. Reynolds was in military custody for the crime of
desertion. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus from a New York
state court, claiming that he had never enlisted in the first place. After
a full hearing, the state judge remanded him to military custody.
Reynolds then took advantage of Booth. He brought a second
habeas petition, this time in federal court, asserting that the state court
lacked jurisdiction in the first proceeding. Despite Booth, the federal
district court asserted that state courts retained the authority to issue
writs of habeas corpus to federal officers on behalf of federal
prisoners. 24 Reynolds, in fact, read Booth to mean that state courts
could issue a writ to test the truth-and validity--of federal custody,
reasoning that an invalid federal detention was no federal detention at
all.1 5 If federal custody were valid, then the state court had to dismiss
124. Id. Booth met with substantial resistance in state courts, which continued to
assert their traditional prerogatives. As Charles Warren observed,
Such was the tenacity with which the state courts maintained their authority
to issue writs of habeas corpus, that, for twelve years after the Booth decision,
they continued to issue such writs against federal officials, on the ground that the
Booth case only applied to instances where the prisoner was held under actual
judicial federal process. Thus, during the Civil War, New York, Ohio, Iowa and
Maine judges granted habeas corpus for persons serving in the United States
Army. And as late as 1871, the Massachusetts court said that this power was so
well settled by judicial opinion and long practice that it was not "to be now
disavowed, unless in obedience to an express act of congress, or to a direct
adjudication of the supreme court of the United States."
Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REv. 345, 357 (1930) (quoting
McConologue's Case, 107 Mass. 154, 160 (1871) (Gray, J.)); cf In re Farrand, 8 F Cas.
1070, 1070-71 (D. Ky. 1867) (No. 4678). In Farrand, the local mayor's court attempted to
issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of an allegedly underage recruit, and when the
military officer in charge refused to obey the order of release, the mayor's court ordered him
imprisoned for contempt. The officer then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court
under the 1833 Force Act, alleging that he was held by a state authority for performing
federally imposed duties. Cf In re Neil, 17 F Cas. 1296, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No.
10,089) (state judge may not discharge a soldier on a writ of habeas corpus if the soldier is
held by a bona fide army officer and a federal court will discharge any army officer held in
contempt by a state court for refusal to comply with a state order).
Federal courts showed surprising sympathy with state courts. See, e.g., In re
McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 33, 36 (D. Mass. 1866) (No. 8752) ("I may here confess to a serious
doubt whether, upon the true theory and practice of our mixed government, the state courts
ought ever to have taken jurisdiction of these cases. Upon this point, Ableman v. Booth...
and other authorities ... are instructive. But the practice is now so well established that
only the supreme court of the United States can change it." (citation omitted)).
125. In re Reynolds, 20 F. Cas at 606. The decision stated:
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the proceeding; the state court's writ was permissible as part of the
threshold inquiry into whether it had jurisdiction over the case.
In construing Booth in this remarkably limited fashion, Reynolds
focused on the importance of the habeas court's ability to contradict
the facts in the return:
[I]t has lately been claimed in other cases, as it was claimed in this, that
under the case of Ableman v. Booth a state court has no authority to
inquire into the truth of the facts alleged in a return to a writ of habeas
corpus, or to decide upon their legal effect; in other words, that a state
court has no jurisdiction to inquire whether a person claimed and held
as a soldier has ever enlisted, or, if he have enlisted, whether he is an
infant, and his enlistment therefore illegal and void, if the return sets
forth that he is legally in custody under the authority of the United
States. 2
6
The Reynolds court reasoned that if it were to read Booth to strip
the state courts altogether of habeas jurisdiction, individuals detained
by the armed forces, or others, through forged papers would have no
remedy. 27 Detainees could not contest false papers because the return
to the petition evidencing federal custody-whether true or false-
would conclusively deprive the state court of jurisdiction. 12  Because
[T]he fact that the prisoner is legally held under the authority of the United States
must not only be alleged, but proved, in order to oust the jurisdiction of a state
court or judge in a habeas corpus case, there can certainly be no doubt that all
those judges require, not merely the allegation or return of facts showing such
authority, but also their actual existence,-the actual truth of the return, and not
the mere formal, but false, assertion of a state of facts that does not exist. Even
under this latter construction of these opinions, the state court or judge, if
authorized bythe state law to entertain proceedings upon habeas corpus, should
certainly proceed and order the discharge of the party, unless the facts alleged are
proved or admitted; leaving the party holding the prisoner to retain or discharge
him, at his peril, upon the ground that he is actually authorized to hold him under
the laws of the United States, although not able to prove the facts in the
proceeding before the state court or judge. No other course, it is submitted, can
be consistent with the authority or dignity of the state, the duty of the judge, or the
rights of the citizen.
Id. at 606-07.
126. Id. at 605.
127. Id. at 605-06.
128. Id. What is more, the district judge observed, parity would require the same
practice of the federal courts in situations in which the return alleged that petitioner was held
under state process, since that would divest the federal court ofjurisdiction. Id. at 606-07.
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federal courts were often unable to go behind the return to test the
same facts, the petitioners would be left without a remedy.1
29
The Reynolds court thus found that the state habeas court
properly had jurisdiction to consider the validity of Reynolds's
detention, but held that the state decision was not res judicata to a
federal habeas proceeding.130 That rather tangled web left the federal
court free to consider Reynolds's petition. Here, the district court
demonstrated more than sympathy for the prerogatives of its sister
courts; it relied on existing state habeas practice, an influence other
federal courts explicitly acknowledged as well.'
3
'
In the ensuing oral argument, government counsel argued that the
issues of fact before the habeas court were more properly resolved in
the already pending court martial proceedings. Unmoved, the
Reynolds court asserted that a court martial had no jurisdiction to try a
citizen who had never belonged to the military. 32 The court then held
a full hearing to determine whether the prisoner had ever been a
member of the military.133 As is evident from the opinion, the court
took oral testimony from both the prisoner134 and Riley, an employee
of a recruiting broker in Detroit,'15 as well as from several alibi,
character, and other witnesses. 36 The judge concluded that Reynolds
129. ld.
130. I at 607-08.
131. See, e.g., In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 17,20-21 (E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8751).
132. In re Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. at 609. The court admitted, however, that it had no
jurisdiction over the offense of desertion. Id.
133. Id. at 612.
134. Id. There was some question whether the prisoner, as a party to the action, was a
competent witness on his own behalf, but the court held that both New York and federal law
permitted the petitioner to testify since this was a civil matter. Id.
135. ld. at 609-10 ('The evidence bearing upon this question of fact has been
deliberately considered, and I cannot doubt that it is my duty to discharge the prisoner,
believing, as I do, that the testimony of Riley in regard to the petitioner's enlistment ... is
entirely false."). Riley testified that he knew Reynolds from home and that he witnessed
Reynolds enlist under the name of William Sloan. Under extremely successful cross
examination, Riley sought the protection of the Fifth Amendment to avoid incriminating
himself regarding whether he brought men to Detroit to enlist under false names and had
done so himself. Riley also confessed that he had been indicted for stealing sheep and steers
and had been convicted of theft of property worth more than $25. He also testified that he
and his brother were indicted for stabbing Reynolds and that Reynolds had been a witness at
his brother's trial, and that he made his perjurious affidavit about a week after that trial. Id.
at 610.
136. Id at 611 (containing extensive testimony regarding the whereabouts of the
prisoner at all relevant times, that his height and hair color did not match the description on
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had never enlisted and was the victim of a malicious fraud by Riley,
explicitly basing his decision on the demeanor evidence of the prisoner
and his chief accuser during their oral testimony.'37 As a result, the
court ordered that Reynolds be released from custody.13
Other federal decisions rendered during the Civil War demon-
strate a similar willingness to go beyond the return in order to remedy
wartime abuses. In one interesting case connected with a purported
Confederate plot to bum New York City,139 for example, a federal
circuit court strongly asserted its right to re-examine the entire record
of commitment proceedings before a federal magistrate,' 40 reweighing
the magistrate's findings of both fact and law. Even though the return
was facially sufficient, the circuit court found that the supporting
evidence was too unreliable to establish probable cause.141 In doing
so, the circuit court discussed the lack of admissible evidence at the
hearing that would establish a link between the defendant and the
alleged crime and commented unfavorably on the magistrate's reliance
on defense counsel's compelled testimony.42
the enlistment papers, and character testimony regarding the good reputation of the prisoner
and the bad reputation of Riley).
137. Id. at 611-12 ("It is perhaps impossible, now, to say what my conclusions would
have been if the case stood upon this evidence alone [referring to Riley and the alibi and
character witnesses], and the evidence afforded by the inspection of the petitioner in respect
to his age ... but I am strongly inclined to the opinion that I should have held, upon his
evidence alone, that the petitioner ought to be discharged. But the petitioner himself was
sworn as a witness, and directly and positively contradicted Riley in respect to everything
which related to his alleged enlistment, or being in uniform, or in the military service; and I
have no doubt that he testified to the truth.").
138. Id. at 612.
139. In re Martin, 16 F. Cas. 875, 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 9151). Martin, the
defendant, had been arrested and imprisoned on charges that he knowingly attempted to
destroy public records of the United States and that he gave aid and comfort to the rebellion.
Both charges were based on his presence in New York under an assumed name and his
association with suspicious characters.
140. Id. at 878 ('The importance of this power of the court, to look into the evidence
as far as may be necessary, in order to decide whether it is proper or not to hold a prisoner in
confinement, will be clearly seen on examining the condition of things if no such power
existed.... Either the prisoner would be kept in confinement just as long as the prosecution
might see fit to hold him, or the court would be compelled to make a mere arbitrary order
limiting the time within which he should be indicted or discharged.").
141. Id. at 879. The court commented acerbically on the quality of the evidence
involved: "It will, I presume, not be contended that the color of the defendant's carpet-bag,
or the fact that he had a small amount of gold, supplies any material evidence in the case."
Id.
142. Id. at 879-80. Counsel testified that his client was reputed to be a member of the
Confederate army.
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These cases indicate that federal courts participated in the general
extension of evidentiary procedure in habeas corpus that characterized
the antebellum period, even while acting under the common-law
restrictions embodied in the habeas provisions of the 1789 Judiciary
Act. Federal courts challenged the return in order to perform the
habeas core function of preventing government abuse, especially in
cases that involved military service. These developments preceded-
and subsequently converged with-another series of pressures to
expand federal habeas jurisdiction, pressures arising from the growing
sectional crisis over slavery.143 Thus, the story has to backtrack in time
slightly in order to describe fully the contributions of the antislavery
movement to the growth of habeas corpus. It is here that our story
turns to irony.
IV. STATE HABEAS CORPUS AS A TOOL OFTHE ANTISLAVERY
MOVEMENT
The War of 1812 postponed the national crisis over slavery,
although it provided a foretaste of the creative uses of habeas corpus
yet to come. As the sectional crisis resolved itself into a crisis of
federal-state relations, fueled by westward territorial expansion, both
sides had recourse to the ancient weapon in intragovernmental
squabbles: the writ of habeas corpus. Much of the battle was played
out over the plight of fugitive slaves 4 -an emotional issue familiar to
those who have read Uncle Tom's Cabin,'45 with its famous scene of
the fugitive Eliza crossing the frozen Ohio River to freedom.
During the antebellum period, both antislavery and proslavery
forces had what charitably may be termed an instrumental view of
federalism. At the risk of oversimplification, antislavery activists
tended to stress the primacy of the federal government when it came to
congressional power to exclude slavery from the territories, but
maintained that states had the right to regulate the status of persons
143. See NEELY, supra note 20, at xiv. Neely pointed out that by the 1850s,
Republicans thought of the writ, if at all, primarily as a tool to free fugitive slaves. For
example, Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury from 1861 to 1864, had repeatedly
invoked habeas corpus in fugitive cases. Abraham Lincoln, it might be added, had
represented the master in an Illinois habeas case brought on behalf of a fugitive by two
abolitionists. Id.
144. COVER, supra note 9, at 185-91.
145. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN OR, LIFE AMONG ThE LOWLY
(1852).
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within their borders when discussing state obligations to return
fugitives to bondage.' 46 Conversely, the South and its allies advocated
local control within the territories, raising constitutional challenges to
Congress's power to legislate for the territories on the slavery issue,
but were quite content to hide behind expansive federal power when
talking about fugitives. Not surprisingly, both sides were blissfully
untroubled by any inconsistency in their positions.
The groundwork for the crisis over the rendition of fugitives was
laid in the Constitution itself 47 In 1793, Congress first implemented
the guarantee of Article IV, Section 2-the Fugitive Slave Clause la8-
in a law entitled "An Act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons
escaping from the service of their masters., 149 The first half dealt with
criminal extradition;150 the second half empowered a slaveholder or his
146. See generally MCPHERSON, supra note 84, at 47-233 (discussing political and
legal maneuvering by both antislavery activists and Southern sympathizers with regard to
fugitive slaves and to the expansion of slavery into the territories prior to the Civil War).
McPherson commented with regard to Southerners, "On all issues but one, antebellum
southerners stood for state's rights and a weak federal government. The exception was the
fugitive slave law of 1850, which gave the national government more power than any other
law yet passed by Congress." Id. at 78; see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTr CASE:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND PoLITCs (1978); THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN
ALL. THEPERSONALLBERTYLAWS OFTHmNORTH, 1780-1861, at 1-106 (1974).
147. The contradiction between the principles espoused by the American Revolution
and chattel slavery was not lost on the Founders. See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN
SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975).
148. Article IV, § 2, clause 3, of the United States Constitution provided in part:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
How the Framers expected this clause to operate has been the subject of much uncertainty,
both then and now. At the time, James Madison said the clause "secures us in that property
which we now possess. At present, if any slave elopes to any of those states where slaves
are free, he becomes emancipated by their laws; for the laws of the states are uncharitable to
one another in this respect." 3 ELuIOT's DEBATES: THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrrUrTION 453 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
1937). The Fugitive Slave Clause was, according to Madison, "expressly inserted, to enable
owners of slaves to reclaim them." Id.; see DON FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW AND
PoLITCs 21-24, 207-08 (1981); William W. Wiecek, The Witch at the Christening: Slavery
and the Constitution's Origins, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONsTrrToN
167, 178 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987).
149. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
150. Id. §§ 1, 2. The law provided that whenever one governor, upon proper
paperwork, asked another governor for the return of a fugitive from justice who had fled
from one state into another, it "shall be the duty" of the governor of the second state to
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agent to cross state lines, seize the alleged fugitive slave, and take the
fugitive before any federal judge or local magistrate."' Once there,
upon proof of ownership, the slaveholder received a certificate
entitling him to return home with his property. 52 Not only was this a
significant blow to state sovereignty, it raised serious questions about
the safety of free blacks. The standards of proof in the hearing were
low, and the possibilities for abuse by cynical persons were
correspondingly high." 3
One result of the 1793 Act's weakness was enactment of so-
called personal liberty laws in the northern states. 54 These were
antikidnapping statutes that attempted to supplement the Fugitive
Slave Act's rudimentary fact-finding processes. 5 Another result was
increased use of state habeas corpus to test the legality of the
slaveholder's claim to the person detained.5 6 This tactic put federal
honor that request. The law provided no means of enforcement; accordingly, interstate
rendition of fugitives from justice remained largely a matter of comity.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Although one commentator suggested that the Act's "administrative procedures
were so cumbersome ... that it was a 'dead letter' from the start in regions where public
sympathies were hostile to slavery," DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN POUICS 1765-1820, at 286 (1971), the more common reaction was that of Don
Fehrenbacher, who called the law "an invitation to kidnapping." FEHRENBACHER, supra
note 148, at 21.
154. NEELY, supra note 20, at xvi (asserting that "Illinois was the only contiguous
state of the U.S. not to pass some sort of personal-liberty law before the Civil War").
155. For a full discussion of the personal liberty laws, see MORRIS, supra note 146, at
1-70. Robert Cover, in his influential study of the subject, suggested that the sympathy
engendered by fugitives-and particularly by free blacks wrongfully captured-led the
antislavery bar to focus on the representation of fugitives and those who assisted them.
COVER, supra note 9, at 185-91.
156. COVER, supra note 9, at 185-91; Oaks, supra note 21, at 267-68. In 1837, the
radical abolitionist, Alvan Stewart, went so far as to argue, based on the Fifth Amendment to
the federal Constitution, that slavery was unlawful within the United States unless the
person had been lawfully deprived of freedom by means of indictment, trial, and judgment
in a court of law. Anything less was not "due process of law." In the absence of due
process, "'any judge in the United States, who is clothed with sufficient authority, to grant a
writ of Habeas Corpus"' had the power to "'discharge the slave and give him full liberty."'
JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw 68 (First Collier Books 1965) (1951) (quoting
Alvan Stewart).
Antislavery lawyers also raised a series of constitutional challenges to the 1793 Act-
and later to the 1850 Act-alleging, among other things, that the 1793 law impermissibly
required state officers to enforce federal law, a position consonant with the federalism of the
day. In addition, antislavery advocates argued that Congress lacked the power to legislate on
the issue of slavery altogether. See, e.g., Allen Johnson, The Constitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Acts, 31 YAI L.J. 161, 165 (1921); Anthony J. Sebok, Judging the Fugitive
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and state authorities in direct conflict and placed a premium on the
proverbial race to the courthouse. But if the state habeas court was
required to treat the return as conclusive, then the writ presented few
advantages over the Fugitive Slave Act proceeding. Accordingly,
antislavery forces devoted substantial energy to securing broader
evidentiary powers for state habeas courts.
57
As early as 1816, for example, Richard Peters, eventually a
reporter of the United States Supreme Court, discounted the view of
some commentators that production of the certificate showing that a
court had determined the fugitive's status was "a sufficient return to
any writ of Habeas Corpus, which may be issued.' ' 158  Such a
conclusive presumption, based on exparte testimony, "violated 'one of
the fundamental principles of the administration of justice"'; it allowed
a decision 'against the liberty of a fellow man, upon allegations,
which he had no opportunity to contradict, and the witness in support
of which, he is not permitted to confront or interrogate."",159 Instead,
Peters argued, a habeas court should fully reconsider a claim of tifle,
even if a judge or magistrate had already decided the issue when
Slave Acts, 100 YALE L.J. 1835, 1849 n.70 (1991) (speculating that location of the Fugitive
Clause in Article IV, while congressional powers are exclusively enumerated in Article I,
supports the conclusion that Congress had no power to legislate to enforce the Clause).
157. In 1837, antislavery activists also made an effort to obtain a right to jury trial for
fugitives by reviving the ancient common-law writ of de homine replegiando. This writ was
a form of personal replevin, which, despite its extremely cumbersome process, provided for
trial by jury on all issues joined by the parties. Federal courts have authority to issue de
homine replegiando under the All Writs Act, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988)). De homine replegiando had a small but useful role in
antislavery activity. See, e.g., Margaret v. Muzzy, Case No. 40, dated 1768 in 2 Tm LEGAL
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 58-59 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (stating that a
black woman was replevied and the issue of her freedom went to a jury); COVER, supra note
9, at 164-65; MoRRIs, supra note 146, at 11; Oaks, supra note 21, at 281-87.
What may have been de homine replegiando's most notable moment came somewhat
before its northern revival, at the hands of a South Carolina federal court in a case called
Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366). A South Carolina law
provided that, if a ship carrying free blacks entered a South Carolina port, the blacks would
be enslaved if the captain failed to leave with them. Id. at 493. A boatload of such stranded
people, who were detained for sale by South Carolina authorities, petitioned the federal
court for habeas corpus. The court found that it lacked habeas jurisdiction because the
blacks were in state custody. Id. at 498. Undaunted, it held the South Carolina law
unconstitutional and issued a writ of de homine replegiando to release the prisoners. Id.
158. MORRIs, supra note 146, at 34 (quoting letter from Richard Peters to William
Wayne (Dec. 31, 1816)).
159. Id.
1995] HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE PRISONERS 37
granting the certificate permitting the fugitive's removal to a slave
state."6
In late 1817, those sympathetic to the interests of the slaveholders
responded to the direction of northern opinion. They introduced a
draft bill in Congress to amend the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.61
Among its provisions was one that made a slaveholder's sworn
statement that he held the fugitive under the Act a complete return to a
writ of habeas corpus, if the slaveholder had already obtained a judicial
certificate adjudicating the status of the captive.' 62 Taken on its own
terms, this was a fairly moderate suggestion; it did not seek to outlaw
state interference in the recapture of fugitives, but simply to limit it.
Nevertheless, one Senator termed the draft bill an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus because "a
person of color taken under it ... cannot have the right to his freedom
tried by the judge before whom the return of the writ of habeas corpus
is made."",163 A supporter of the bill responded that a writ of habeas
corpus merely gave the person in custody the right to "'demand an
inquiry whether he is held in custody upon a ground warranted by law;
and if the judge before whom he is brought finds he is detained by
legal authority and upon legal grounds, he cannot discharge him but is
obliged to remand him."' 164 The sectional controversy was clearly
focusing on the right to challenge the federal process embodied in the
return.
States, such as New York, took up the challenge with relish. In
1829, the New York legislature passed an act entitled: "Of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, to bring up a person to testify, or to answer in certain
cases."1 65 Intended to supplement the federal Fugitive Slave Act, the
law provided that, in order to claim a runaway, the claimant had to
apply to a state court authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus. Upon
presentation of acceptable proof of title, the state court would issue a
writ of habeas corpus to the sheriff in the county in which the fugitive
resided or was detained. The sheriff would then bring the fugitive
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 35-37.
163. Id. at 38 (quoting the remarks of Senator James Burrill, Jr. of Rhode Island in
31-32 ANNALs OF CONG. 231 (1818)).
164. Id. (quoting the remarks of Senator William Smith of South Carolina in 31-32
ANNALS OF CONG. 231 (1818)).
165. 2 N.Y Rnv. STATS. 560-61, §§ 6-12 (1829).
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before the court, which would hold a hearing, possibly including live
testimony, in order to try the issue of freedom.
Within a few years, New York went even further. It followed a
number of other states in passing a law providing that when a writ of
habeas corpus was sought on behalf of a person alleged to be a fugitive
from labor, the issues of title and freedom should be tried to a jury. 66
Other states merely had recourse to their statutes permitting the habeas
court to go behind the return. Those provisions had the effect of
permitting claims of title to be fully tried by the habeas court.167 The
actual cases brought on behalf of the fugitives are legion, well beyond
the scope of this Article.
Then, in a series of cases, the Supreme Court attempted to put an
end to the merry anarchy spreading throughout the free states. 168 For
purposes of the present discussion, the two most important decisions
were Prigg v. Pennsylvania169 and Ableman v. Booth,'70 both of which
aimed to restrict state-court habeas powers over areas of federal
interest. Legal historians have made a substantial cottage industry out
of the ambiguities of Prigg, a case that generated seven separate
opinions in an era in which most opinions were unanimous.' 7 '
166. Act of May 6, 1840, § 1, 1840 N.YL. 174; cf. Oaks, supra note 21, at 278 n.186
(citing Act of June 1, 1838, § 1, 1838 CONN. COMp. LAws 572; Act of June 22, 1824, § 3,
1838 IND. REV. STATS. 322; Act of Oct. 29, 1840, § 1, 1840 VT. LAWS 13 (providing jury
trial for fugitives in habeas corpus proceedings)).
New York's relationship with the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act was nothing if not complex.
In Jack v. Martin, Chancellor Reuben Walworth, speaking for the New York's highest court,
found the Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional due to Congress's lack of power to pass such
an act. 14 Wend. 507, 526 (N.Y 1835). At the same time, he also upheld the claim of the
master and the obligation of state officials to return fugitives, bottoming the obligation
directly on the constitutional Fugitive Slave Clause. See Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 625-27 (1993).
167. HURD, supra note 36, at 283-92.
168. For a comprehensive survey of the slavery-related cases decided by the Supreme
Court, see William W. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme
Court, 1820-1860, 65 J. AM. HIST. 34 (1978); see also Earl M. Maltz, Slavery, Federalism,
and the Structure of the Constitution, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 466 (1992) (discussing key
cases).
169. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
170. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). Booth was issued on March 7, 1859.
171. At the time, dissents, much less separate concurrences, were rare. Finkelman,
supra note 166, at 606. Other recent entrants in the Prigg sweepstakes include Barbara
Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story, Slavery, and Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 78 CoRNEtLL. Rnv. 1086, 1088 (1993); Maltz, supra note 168, at 473-80;
see COVER, supra note 9, at 166-71; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 148, at 21-23, 118-19;
MORRIS, supra note 146, at 94-107.
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Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that over significant reservations
in the dissents, Prigg established that the power to regulate the
fugitive-slave issue rested in the federal government.'72 Prigg held
that the Constitution guaranteed the slaveholder the "positive,
unqualified right" to the "immediate possession" of his property 73 and
therefore invalidated any law that "interrupts, limits, delays, or
postpones the right of the owner" to recaption. 174  In addition, the
majority found, Congress had both the constitutional right and the
obligation to implement the enforcement mechanisms necessary to
uphold the right embodied in the Fugitive Slave Clause. 75 The states
could pass no law either in aid of or to obstruct the right of the
master.
1 76
Prigg was a triumph of federal supremacy. Even the dissenters1 77
agreed that the federal government had the right to regulate the
rendition of fugitive slaves. Justice Story's decision made only one
concession to state autonomy: States were permitted to treat
unclaimed runaways as they pleased, even expel them like any other
vagrants.178 Prigg ought to have put the states out of the business of
issuing writs of habeas corpus to persons held under the Fugitive Slave
Act-even if the slaveholder was exercising the right to self-help
without judicial process. As we shall see shortly, it did not come close
to achieving that end.
Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Ableman v. Booth.7 9 Many things had happened in those sixteen years
to sharpen sectional tensions: the collapse of the Missouri
172. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 622-25 (Story, J.).
173. Id. at 612 (Story, J.).
174. Id. (Story, J.).
175. Id. at 615-16 (Story, J.). The Court's opinion argued that the Fugitive Slave
Clause was self-executing, so that free states had to recognize the common-law principle of
recaption, which granted the slaveholder "the right to seize and repossess the slave, which
the local laws of his own state confer upon him as property." Id. at 613 (Story, J.). Thus,
Prigg determined that slavery itself was a local law issue, like other forms of status and
property, such as marriage and rights of inheritance. It might be argued that Prigg was the
first attempt at a federal constitutional rule governing choice of law, at least with regard to
status, and it was one that did not encourage further efforts in that direction.
176. See, e.g., id. at 662 (McLean, J., dissenting).
177. Justice McLean dissented and Justice Taney concurred in part and dissented in
part on the issue of whether the power to legislate rested exclusively in Congress. Id. at 626
(McLean, J., dissenting), 658 (Taney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. d. at 625 (Story, J.).
179. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
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Compromise, the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Dred Scott
decision,an and most important, the enactment of the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850.181 Booth arose from facts that demonstrated the conflict
between state and federal authority; its holding was another attempt to
restrict the powers of state habeas courts in the interests of federal
policy and federal supremacy. Part IMI briefly previewed Booth's
holding that state courts could not issue writs of habeas corpus to
federal prisoners, 82 while discussing Booth's role in shifting military
abuse cases from state to federal courts. Here, we will consider the
facts that gave rise to Booth as epitomizing both the use of habeas
corpus on behalf of slaves and state court resistance to federal
assertions of power, as well as the legal rationale of Booth itself.
Booth began with the 1854 vigilante rescue of a fugitive slave
who had been captured by his master in Wisconsin. Federal
authorities prosecuted Sherman M. Booth, a leading participant in the
rescue, for violating the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. After being taken
into federal custody, Booth was twice freed by writs of habeas corpus
issued by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which found the restraint
illegal on the ground that the federal statute was unconstitutional. The
second Wisconsin writ of habeas corpus was even more provocative
than the first: Booth had already been convicted by a federal district
court of violating the 1850 Act when the Wisconsin Supreme Court
ordered his discharge from federal custody, finding that the Fugitive
Slave Act was unconstitutional, and that therefore the federal
proceedings under it were void.
83
Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Taney asserted in
unwavering language the unavailability of state habeas corpus to reach
180. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,455 (1857) (holding that residence in
a free state did not entitle a slave successfully to sue for freedom upon return to a slave
state). See MCPHERSON, supra note 84, at 121-30 (describing the collapse of the Missouri
Compromise that had banned slavery north of 36*30' in order to secure passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, which permitted local option regarding slavery in territory previously
closed to the institution).
181. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60,9 Stat. 462.
182. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 523.
183. Id. at 507-14. This exercise of the habeas power was all the more noteworthy
because the Wisconsin habeas statutes in effect at the time excluded persons confined under
"process, by any court or judge of the United States, in a case where such court or judge has
exclusive jurisdiction" and under "the final judgment or decree of any competent court of
civil or criminal jurisdiction." Id at 516.
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a prisoner in federal restraint. 84 As Robert Cover has observed,
"Taken at its broadest, and there are no qualifications in the decision,
the doctrine was a startling assertion of federal power"' 85 and a
remarkable reversal of existing practice.18 6  Booth's language
underscores its uncompromising approach: "[T]he sphere of action
appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the
judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the line of
division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the
eye;"' 8 7 federal supremacy is established by the constitution in
"language... too plain to admit of doubt or to need comment."' 88
The Court observed that state courts, and in particular state
habeas powers, cannot trench on federal supremacy. Although a state
court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner, once apprised in
the return that the individual is in federal custody, the court "can
proceed no further."' 89  On this point, the Supreme Court was
adamant:
[I]f the authority of a State, in the form of judicial process or otherwise,
should attempt to control the marshal or other authorized officer or
agent of the United States, in any respect, in the custody of his
prisoner, it would be his duty to resist it, and to call to his aid any force
that might be necessary to maintain the authority of law against illegal
interference.' 90
Surprisingly, neither Prigg nor Booth put state courts out of the
federal habeas business. Instead, both decisions illustrate that the
battle between state and federal interests in the north was playing itself
out in the courtroom through the use of habeas corpus, the traditional
common-law weapon in intragovemmental warfare. The Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850 urmed these relatively minor engagements into
pitched battles. Booth was the culmination of one such battle. The
story now turns to other such fights and with them to the decisions in
which lower federal courts finally discovered that the habeas
provisions of the 1833 Force Act gave them the additional powers they
184. Id. at 516.
185. COVER, supra note 9, at 187.
186. Id.
187. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 516.
188. M at517.
189. Id. at523.
190. Id. at 524.
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needed to impose federal law on the recalcitrant states. It is in these
cases, with their efforts to uphold federal rights, that relitigation in the
modem sense begins.
V. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO STATE RESISTANCE TO THE FUGITIVE
SLAVE Actr HABEAS CoRPus UNDER THE 1833 FORCE Acr
In a remarkable series of cases emanating from efforts to enforce
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,' 9' the federal and state courts
skirmished over state efforts-particularly in Ohio and the upper
midwest-to avoid rendition of fugitive slaves. The conflicts played
out through competing writs of habeas corpus: States attempted to
free fugitives or their rescuers detained under federal law and federal
authorities tried to free slaveholders, their allies, or federal officers
detained under state process. Because these cases involved federal
relief for prisoners in state custody for acts performed while executing
federal law, petitioners had recourse, for the first time, to the habeas
corpus provisions of the 1833 Force Act.192 Almost by accident, the
courts and petitioners discovered that the Force Act conferred broad
new habeas powers on the federal judiciary as a necessary aid to the
Act's primary aim, the assertion of federal supremacy over the states.
Most of the federal cases invoked the core habeas function.
Federal courts were asked to release improperly incarcerated pretrial
detainees-usually federal officers in state jails awaiting trial on state
assault charges. In one of the many twists in these cases, antislavery
forces now urged a limited habeas jurisdiction, reminding the federal
courts that a facially sufficient return was conclusive proof of the
191. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. Passed as part of the Compromise of
1850 that secured the admission of California as a free state and ended the slave trade in the
District of Columbia, the Act significantly expanded federal involvement in the return of
fugitives, providing for the appointment of special federal commissioners to hear fugitive
rendition proceedings and to issue certificates of removal.
Claimants were authorized to secure warrants of arrest or to seize runaways themselves
and to bring the fugitives before either a court or a commissioner. The commissioner was
then to issue a certificate of removal based on either the live testimony of the claimant or on
affidavit evidence. Testimony by the fugitive was excluded. If the commissioner issued the
certificate, he received a fee of $10; if he denied the slaveholder's claim, he received only
$5. Commissioners were also empowered to appoint "suitable persons" to execute any
warrant or process they might issue. Moreover, if a claimant feared that the fugitive would
be rescued before return to slavery, a federal marshal could be required to retain the fugitive
in custody and to employ as many people as necessary to overcome the threatened rescue
and deliver the fugitive across state lines to slavery.
192. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7,4 Stat. 632, 635. See supra note 21.
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legality of detention. That facial sufficiency appeared in the form of a
regular state arrest warrant.
Federal courts, on the other hand, now assumed the power to
look behind the return and to allow the prisoner to prove his federal
defense. They did so as a necessary aid to their habeas jurisdiction and
to the interests of federal supremacy. Almost unnoticed amid the
rhetoric of federal right and impending anarchy, federal courts, pressed
to the wall, freed federal marshals incarcerated on validly issued state
contempt judgments, a profound extension of federal powers. Federal
courts now treated what they had previously seen as sister courts of
coordinate jurisdiction as inferior tribunals of limited jurisdiction, akin
to courts martial and other fora subject to federal revisory powers.
In 1853, the first of these resistance cases-apparently the first
case to apply the habeas provision of the 1833 Force Act93--arose in
Pennsylvania. The facts underlying Ex parte Jenkins194 anticipate the
193. The author reviewed every volume of Federal Cases, compiling reported lower
federal court cases from 1789 through 1880, and reviewed each case listed in the index
under the topic "habeas corpus." Even with a generous construction, there are surprisingly
few such reported cases-less than 50-before 1867. Research has failed to disclose any
reported habeas cases raising the Force Act in its original context, the Nullification Crisis,
presumably because, as a result of President Jackson's strong action, no federal agents were
then imprisoned by state authorities for enforcing the tariff that occasioned the crisis. There
seem to be no reported cases invoking the Force Act in any other context before mid-
century. Although it is difficult to prove a negative, internal evidence in a number of the
post-1850 cases indicates that the Force Act was a legal novelty, not well known to counsel
or the courts. For example, in Ex parte Jenkins, counsel for the abolitionist interests acting
as amicus curiae argued as if the case were about the applicability of the 1789 Act, either
unaware of the difference between the two or hopeful that the court was unaware of the
distinction. 13 F Cas. 445,447 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7259).
One reason for this obscurity may be that counsel failed to recognize, at least until
1850, that the Force Act's habeas provision was more broadly applicable than the removal
provisions of the same Act. The latter provided for removal of all suits or prosecutions
against officers of the United States or other persons commenced on account of any acts
done under the customs laws. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, 4 Stat. 632, 633-34; cf. Act of Feb. 4,
1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198 (providing for the removal of actions brought against
officers of the United States for acts done under laws allowing seizure of dutiable goods
aboard vessels). As observed in Hart & Wechsler's Federal Courts,
Prompted by New England's resistance to the War of 1812, Congress inserted in
an act for the collection of customs duties a provision ... for the removal to the
federal circuit court of any suit or prosecution begun in a state court against
federal officers or other persons as a result of enforcement of the act.
BATOR ET AL, supra note 120, at 1336.
194. Jenkins, 13 E Cas. at 445-46. Peller cited Jenkins in support of his thesis that
federal courts engaged in extensive relitigation before the Civil War. Peller, supra note 1, at
617-18 n.202.
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succeeding resistance cases. Four federal marshals attempted forcibly
to seize a fugitive slave, who managed to escape them. On the
evidence of a friend of the fugitive, a Pennsylvania state court issued a
warrant charging the marshals with assault and battery with intent to
kill. They were then arrested and detained in state jail. Federal
authorities sought the marshals' release by invoking the habeas
provisions of the 1833 Act and arguing that the marshals were in state
custody because of their efforts to enforce federal law, the Fugitive
Slave Act.
The petition for habeas corpus came before Justice Robert C.
Grier of the United States Supreme Court, sitting on circuit in his
home state. Grier was a northern Democrat who tended, in his
personal politics, to be opposed to the antislavery movement, if not
actually proslavery. Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1846 at the
age of fifty-two by President James K. Polk, Grier had previously
served as a state judge. In 1853, he took the nationalist position of his
party. By 1857, he had sufficiently hardened in his views, and was
sufficiently caught in the sectional cross-currents, that he was one of
only two justices to join Justice Taney's Dred Scott opinion without
elaboration. 95
In Jenkins, Justice Grier first restated the inviolability of the
federal interests represented by the Fugitive Slave Act.196  A
commissioner's finding that a person was a fugitive gave the
slaveholder an uncontestable right to transport the fugitive from the
state of capture to a slave state. 97 Thus, Justice Grier asserted, a writ
of habeas corpus-either state or federal-was not available to
prisoners held by legal process emanating from the Fugitive Slave
Act.
198
Justice Grier then turned to the nationalist interests behind the
1833 Force Act. Congress passed the Act in order to secure federal
supremacy over the states. 99 When state and federal policy clashed,
state interests would have to give way. Justice Grier wrote:
195. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,399 (1859).
196. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, supra note 84, at 172-73, 179 (discussing, among other
things, pressure placed on Justice Grier by President-elect Buchanan, a fellow
Pennsylvanian, to join Taney's opinion).
197. Jenkins, 13 F Cas. at 446-47.
198. Id. at447.
199. Id. at 447-48.
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This act was passed when a certain state of this Union had threatened
to nullify acts of congress, and to treat those as criminals, who should
attempt to execute them; and it was intended as a remedy against such
state legislation. If the state of Pennsylvania had, by act of legislature,
declared that the fugitive law should not be executed within her
borders, and had directed her officers to arrest and imprison those of
the United States who should attempt to execute it, would not this
court have been bound to treat such act as unconstitutional and void,
and discharge their officers from imprisonment under it.20 0
Aside from the fact that the Jenkins writ was directed to state
authorities on behalf of state prisoners, Justice Grier was at pains to
show that his use of habeas powers was procedurally routine: "A
warrant of arrest issued by a justice of the peace has none of the
characteristics of a judgment of a court of record, and is therefore not
conclusive evidence that the prisoner is rightly deprived of his liberty."
"It is every day's practice,"201 Grier observed, to inquire into the
sufficiency of an arrest warrant.202  "If this could not be done," he
stated, "the writ of habeas corpus would little deserve the eulogies
which it has received as a protection to the liberty of the citizen."203
He then ordered the release of the marshals on the ground that they fell
within the terms of the 1833 Act because they were enforcing a federal
law when arrested.204
Antislavery proponents then brought a state civil suit on behalf of
the fugitive for trespass vi et armis against the four marshals. The
marshals were again arrested and jailed, this time on a warrant issued
by a Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice. Once again, the marshals
brought a federal petition for habeas corpus; this time their case came
before Judge Kane of the same court.25
200. Id.
201. Id. at 447.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 448.
205. Id. at 449. Justice Grier was absent at the time, presumably in Washington.
Judge Kane already had a rather checkered career in this line of cases. In the so-called
"Christiana affair," the killing of a slavecatcher by armed blacks near Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, there were forty-one treason indictments, largely at the behest of Judge Kane.
At the trial of the first two defendants, however, the jury returned not guilty verdicts after a
strong charge by Justice Grier to the effect that treason required more than armed resistance
to the enforcement of a particular statute. United States v. Hanway, 26 R Cas. 105, 121
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (No. 15,299); see McPrERSON, supra note 84, at 84-85; see also
COVER, supra note 9, at 215 n.* ("Kane also jailed Passmore Williamson and was the
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Here, the players switched positions. Counsel for the fugitive
claimed that, under the common-law practice that governed habeas
corpus, the court was unable to inquire into the facts underlying the
return, even though that document simply recited the plaintiff's
carefully tailored version of the facts, with the arrest warrant
attached.206 Counsel for the marshals wanted the court to accept
evidence about the purported assault. Judge Kane took the middle
ground. He at once ridiculed the suggestion that the court's
evidentiary powers were so limited and discharged the prisoners based
on a technical defect in the affidavits supporting the plaintiff's
papers.20 7
Undaunted, Pennsylvania authorities again arrested the marshals,
this time under a state indictment for riot, assault and battery, and
assault with intent to kill. The indictment failed to mention that the
rioters were federal officers discharging federal duties. Once again,
the marshals petitioned Judge Kane for release. With breathtaking
persistence, once again opposing counsel told Judge Kane that he
lacked jurisdiction to hear evidence disputing the return, which stated
a legally sufficient cause for detention. Again, Judge Kane stated that,
in order to discharge his duties under the 1833 Act, he was entitled-
even obliged-to hear evidence outside the return.0 8 In no other way
could he learn whether the detainees were in fact engaged in the
execution of federal laws when they committed the alleged assault.0 9
Judge Kane then announced his understanding of the court's
obligations under the 1833 Act:
My duties are performed when I have released the prisoner from
unlawful imprisonment; for that imprisonment is unlawful, however
formal it may be, that affects to punish for an act enjoined or justified
by the supreme law of the land; or when I have remanded him to abide
his sentence, or to take his trial.210
primary target for Richard Hildreth's Atrocious Judges: Lives of Judges Infamous as Tools
of Tyrants and Instruments of Oppression.").
206. Jenkins, 13 R Cas. at 448. The irony in this case is obvious. Antislavery forces
had expended considerable effort to convince state courts to go behind the return and even
to provide jury trials in habeas and related proceedings on behalf of fugitives.
207. Id. at 450. Judge Kane found that the plaintiff's affidavits were insufficient as a
matter of law to connect the defendants to the complained-of violence.
208. Id. at 452.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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Judge Kane read the 1833 Act to grant all evidentiary powers
necessary to dispose of the petition accurately; thus, if he found that
the prisoner had a valid federal defense that the state trial court had
ignored, the Act empowered him to discharge a prisoner from custody
under sentence of a state court. This is the first indication that federal
courts would interpret the 1833 Act to permit them to assess the
viability of all federal defenses, and if necessary, to overturn the final
decision of another court of competent jurisdiction for a trial error.
The next reported petition under the 1833 Act came from
Wisconsin, as part of the so-called Sherman Booth Affair, a long series
of cases that ultimately yielded the Supreme Court decision, Ableman
v. Booth.2 1' A year after Jenkins, a Wisconsin federal district court
faced United States ex rel. Garland v. Morris.2 2 Garland claimed he
owned Glover and, with the aid of a federal marshal, Garland captured
Glover and had him jailed. Several things then happened more or less
simultaneously. Some of Glover's friends obtained a writ of habeas
corpus from a Milwaukee county judge, directing the marshal and the
county sheriff to produce Glover in court; a mob rendered resort to
legal process moot by rescuing Glover; the mayor of Racine issued a
warrant charging Garland with assault and battery; and Garland
himself was jailed.1 Garland then petitioned the federal court for
habeas corpus under the 1833 Act. The district court ordered
Garland's discharge on the ground that his seizure of Glover was
sanctioned by the Fugitive Slave Act.2
1 4
As in Jenkins, the decision turned on two related issues: The
court's power independently to determine the matters asserted in the
return and federal supremacy. Again, the court reasoned that its
jurisdiction to issue the writ under the 1833 Act entailed the power to
211. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). For a discussion of the Sherman Booth Affair,
see COVER, supra note 9, at 186-87.
212. 26 F. Cas. 1318 (D. Wis. 1854) (No. 15,811). Pe~ler cited Garland as an
example of relitigation. Peller, supra note 1, at 617. Once again, however, Peller failed to
note that Garland involved a pretrial petition for the writ.
213. Garland, 26F. Cas. at 1318.
214. Id. at 1319. The court stated that the 1850 Act "gave the relator Garland, the
choice to apprehend his fugitive slave either with or without a warrant, and to take him
before a judge or a commissioner for hearing. In this case he was aiding the marshal in the
service of a warrant, at the officer's request. He was acting under a law of the United States,
and also aiding the marshal, or officer, in the service of process of the United States. The
relator is clearly a person within the act of the 2d March, 1833, upon which this writ was
allowed." Id.
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examine whatever evidence was necessary to decide whether the
petitioner had a valid federal defense.215 In reaching its conclusion, the
court waved the flag of federal supremacy:
The law under which the fugitive was apprehended, is a law of the
United States, adopted in pursuance of the constitution, and must be
enforced. The judges, commissioners, marshals, or claimants are not
to be interfered with, in its administration or execution, by state courts
or officers.... The sovereignty of the government, asserted through
the process from its courts, shall not be affected or nullified by
resistance, or by the arrest of officers or men engaged in the service of
such process.
216
Again, however, the court's exercise of habeas power-testing the
validity of a pretrial detention-fit well within the traditional habeas
model in criminal cases. The court's assertion of its ability to reach
state prisoners was based on statute; its ability to determine all matters
that were part of the proceeding was based on the need to effectuate
the interest of federal supremacy asserted in the 1833 Act.
By 1855-a year after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act
and three years after the publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin-the
national mood had turned intransigent. Northern resistance to the
rendition of fugitive slaves hardened, fueled by fears of the
expansionist aims of the slave power and the belief that the Pierce
administration favored southern interests in order to preserve the
Union. 17 In this atmosphere, federal courts quietly established a new
line of precedent in habeas corpus proceedings, granting discharge to
petitioners under state sentence of imprisonment after a final
adjudication of contempt.2"8
Fittingly, the first case, Ex parte Robinson ,21 9-known to history
as the "Rosetta case"-was decided by Supreme Court Justice John
215. Id. at 1319-20.
216. Id. at 1319.
217. See McPBERSON, supra note 84, at 145-69.
218. See, e.g., Exparte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 42-45 (1822) (holding that
habeas corpus under the 1789 Act was unavailable to overturn a final contempt decision).
219. 20 F Cas. 969 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1855) (No. 11,935). Although Peller cited the
later Robinson case, Exparte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 965 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856) (No. 11,934),
he failed to pick up this earlier case, significant in two respects: first, it was decided by a
Supreme Court Justice sitting on circuit, and second, it was the earliest instance of
relitigation after a final judgment in the federal courts. See Peller, supra note 1, at 617.
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McLean,220 sitting on circuit in his home state of Ohio. Although
originally a Democrat, McLean would turn Republican by 1857, and
his presidential ambitions were something of an embarrassment to the
Court. McLean was the most strongly antislavery of the justices-he
dissented in Prig g22 and in two years would be one of two dissenters
in Dred Scott.2
22
Yet, McLean was also strongly committed to the constitutionality
of the Fugitive Slave acts as a proper exercise of federal power, to the
exclusivity of federal power to regulate the return of fugitives, and-at
the time of his dissent in Prigg-to the position that state officials
were morally and constitutionally obligated to enforce the fugitive
slave laws. On the other hand, McLean believed that states could
protect free blacks within their borders. Thus, when he faced the case
of Rosetta Armstead, Justice McLean was a man in some intellectual
discomfortYm
Rosetta Armstead was a black child whose master had brought
her into Ohio. Free blacks obtained a writ of habeas corpus on her
behalf from a local probate judge, who held Rosetta was free because
her master had voluntarily brought her into Ohio, a free state. The
court ordered her discharged from her master's custody and appointed
an antislavery activist, Lewis Van Slyke, as her guardian.
Shortly after Rosetta's discharge, her master had the child seized
and jailed on the warrant of a fugitive slave commissioner. Van Slyke
then petitioned the Hamilton County court of common pleas for a writ
of habeas corpus, securing an order for Rosetta's release in reliance on
the detenrination of the probate court that she was free. Briefly out of
jail, Rosetta was seized a second time on the fugitive slave
commissioner's warrant. The common pleas judge then ordered her
released a second time. When Hiram Robinson, the federal marshal
charged with executing the commissioner's order, refused to obey the
state court order, the judge held him in contempt and jailed him.
Robinson then petitioned the federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus under the 1833 Act. Counsel for Ohio argued that Robinson's
conduct was outside the Act's protections because the commissioner,
220. For a further discussion of Justice McLean's background and his participation in
the cases arising out of the slavery crisis, see COVER, supra note 9, at 101-03.
221. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 658-74 (1842) (McLean, J., dissenting).
222. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,529-64 (1857) (McLean, J., dissenting).
223. See COVER, supra note 9, at 183-85.
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whose orders Robinson was executing when he disobeyed the state
court, had "no authority to act judicially, as he was not appointed as
judges are required to be appointed by the constitution. 224 Ohio, thus,
claimed that the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional because it
conferred Article III powers on non-Article IMI personnel. The
commissioner's acts were therefore void. Accordingly, the marshal
was not confined for an "act done or omitted to be done in pursuance
of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree of any
judge or court thereof''22 as the 1833 Act required.
This might have played better if Justice McLean had not
previously rejected the constitutional claim in another Ohio case. 6
As it was, he gave the argument short shrift. On the other hand,
Justice McLean realized that Rosetta's case did present a genuine
problem: What effect should he give the Ohio probate court's finding
in the first habeas proceeding that Rosetta was free under Ohio law? 227
If the probate court's decision was a final judgment, then Rosetta had a
colorable claim that it barred the proceedings before the
commissioner."
Rather than face the preclusion issue squarely, Justice McLean
concluded that the Hamilton County judge exceeded his jurisdiction
by relying on the probate decision to free Rosetta.229 The Justice found
the Hamilton County decision tantamount to the state exercise of
224. Exparte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 965,970 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856) (No. 11,934).
225. Id. (quoting the Act of Mar. 2, 1833,4 Stat. 634).
226. See Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 339 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9583).
Robert Cover argued that Justice McLean's position regarding the constitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Act hardened after the McQuerry decision. CovER, supra note 9, at 185. As
Cover stated,
[I]t should be noted that in McQuerry the earlier tendencies became a sharply
focused argument. McLean had gone from constitutional bargain to social
contract. He had escalated the basis for enforcement of the Fugitive Act from the
terms upon which the Union was formed-itself a dubious proposition--to the
consensual basis of ordered society. In McQuerry, McLean concerned himself not
with a law, but with law as antithesis to anarchy.
Id. at 183.
227. Robinson, 20 R Cas. at 972.
228. Id. ("Every one who examines the authority in this country and in England, will
find that there have been diversity of judgments on the point whether the decision on a
habeas corpus is final .... ). Justice McLean, however, chose not to take sides in that
debate, although the weight of modem opinion fails to accord preclusive effect to judgments
in habeas corpus proceedings.
229. Id. at 971-72.
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appellate review over a federal tribunal, the commissioner's court."0
Rather, Justice McLean held that the commissioner's court was the
proper forum to resolve the res judicata effect of the probate decision,
not a collateral proceeding in state court: "If the commissioner did
wrong, does that authorize the state judge to interpose by writ of
habeas corpus, and withdraw the case from the federal jurisdiction?"' 1
The common pleas court thus had acted "without any authority of
law," and its attempt to wrest Rosetta from the proper jurisdiction of
the commissioner was "against law, and ... the proceedings are
void.' z 2 As a result, Justice McLean announced, "I am bound to treat
them as a nullity."3 3 He then discharged Robinson from custody. 1
4
Justice McLean's reasoning does not withstand scrutiny. The
issue was not the preclusive effect of the probate judgment, but the
marshal's treatment of the common pleas order. If that order were in
error, the answer was not disobedience, but a writ of mandamus.
Justice McLean, in effect, found that an error of law stripped the state
court of jurisdiction, even of jurisdiction to protect the integrity of its
own processes. The decision treats a state court as if it were a court of
inferior jurisdiction, akin to a court martial, and it flies in the face of
the reasoning underlying the collateral bar rule. Indeed, by the same
reasoning, Justice McLean simply could have focused on the marshal's
federal defense, which was colorable whether or not the commissioner
or the common pleas judge correctly applied the rules of res judicata.
Justice McLean, however, no longer wished to decide the case on
the narrowest available ground, but rather, wanted to make a statement
about federal supremacy. In doing so, he ignored the fact that he
offered Rosetta a hollow remedy for her procedural claim. There was
substantial precedente s that even ex parte findings by a commissioner
were not subject to challenge until the fugitive had been returned to a
230. Id. at 971.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 972.
233. Id.
234. Id. Notably, McLean failed to mention-or distinguish-Ex parte Keamey, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 45 (1822), in which the Supreme Court held that the 1789 Act did not
grant jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person imprisoned for
contempt because contempt entailed a final judgment over which it did not have appellate
authority.
235. E.g., Exparte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7259).
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slave state. Thus, Rosetta was unlikely to find another forum for her
res judicata claim, plausible though it might have been.
Within a year, Hiram Robinson was back in Ohio federal court
testing the same issues in a case that yielded an even stronger decision
overturning a state contempt judgment.236 This time Robinson had
custody of several fugitives awaiting a commissioner's decision
regarding their status. A county probate judge issued a writ of habeas
corpus on their behalf, and in his return, Robinson asserted that his
custody was legal. The state habeas court then issued an order that the
fugitives could not be removed from the jurisdiction until it resolved
the matter. After being served with the state court order, Robinson
delivered the fugitives to their master in Kentucky. The state court
found him guilty of contempt and ordered him both fined and
imprisoned.
Robinson then petitioned the federal court for habeas corpus
under the 1833 Act. This time the petition came before District Judge
Humphrey H. Leavitt.237 A Jackson appointee to the federal bench,
Leavitt had served as a state prosecutor, a state legislator, and a state
judge as well as a member of the Ohio delegation to Congress. Leavitt
entertained antislavery views, but like other judges, he also rigorously
maintained the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act.238 Showing
greater deference to state processes, Judge Leavitt tried to limit the
inquiry to the existence of Robinson's federal defense, thereby hoping
to avoid the appearance of overturning the state court's final
decision:239
In the consideration of this question, it is not necessary to inquire
whether the probate judge could rightfully issue the writ of habeas
236. Robinson, 20 F. Cas. at 969. Peller discussed this case as a primary example of
relitigation. Peller, supra note 1, at 617.
237. Appointed to the federal bench in 1834, Leavitt was born in Suffield,
Connecticut in 1796 and died in Ohio in 1873. He was a distant cousin of the abolitionist,
Joshua Leavitt.
238. Two years after the second Robinson case, he charged an Ohio jury, "Christian
character was not the meaning or the intent of the fugitive slave law, and it would not
therefore answer as a defence for violating the law." HENRY HowE, 2 HISToRIcAL
COLLECTIONS OF OHo 268 (1891). Leavitt later presided over the habeas suit of Clement L.
Vallandigham, a prominent Ohio Copperhead, who was arrested, tried by a military
commission, and sentenced to prison for the duration of the war.
239. To this end, Judge Leavitt announced, "I neither assert nor exercise the
jurisdiction to review or reverse the action of the probate judge." Robinson, 20 F Cas. at
968.
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corpus; neither is it necessary that this court should assert or exercise a
power of revising or reviewing the sentence of the probate judge for
the indefinite imprisonment of the marshal for the alleged contempt.
240
"Indeed," Leavitt announced, "such a jurisdiction is distinctly
disclaimed. ' 241
Instead, Judge Leavitt framed the issue as whether, at the time the
state court ordered Robinson to produce the fugitives, he was subject
to "an imperative obligation resting on him by virtue of a law of the
United States"242 to perform the commissioner's orders, even to
transporting the fugitives out of state in order to avoid a rescue.243
Nevertheless, Judge Leavitt then proceeded to catalogue the probate
court's misdeeds. First, he pointed to a long line of authority holding
that a state writ of habeas corpus was not available to a fugitive once
proceedings before a commissioner had begun.2' Regretfully, he then
expressed certainty that if the state court had obtained custody of the
fugitives, it would have released them. 245
As proof, Judge Leavitt pointed to the probate court's decision
that the commissioner's proceedings were unconstitutional and
therefore void.246 From experience with other state courts, Judge
Leavitt suggested that the probate court would next find that the
fugitives were entitled to discharge because the commissioner's arrest
warrant, arising from a void proceeding, was itself void.2 47 Indeed,
when state counsel urged the unconstitutionality of the Fugitive Slave
Act, he earned Judge Leavitt's weary response, "The act referred to,
whatever views may be entertained of its necessity and expediency, is
a valid and constitutional law, and as such must be respected and
enforced.' 248
240. Id. at 966.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. Among the cases cited in Robinson were Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 539 (1842), as well as Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850) (No.
10,307), and the Rosetta case. Exparte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 969 (C.C.D. Ohio 1855) (No.
11,935). Despite his belief that the writ would not lie once the proceedings before the
federal commissioner were underway, Judge Leavitt made every effort to demonstrate that
Robinson had behaved respectfully to the state court and had not ignored or flouted its
'process. Robinson, 20 F. Cas. at 967.
245. Robinson, 20 F Cas. at 968.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 969; cf COVER, supra note 9.
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The state judicial system--bench and bar alike-refused to be
bound by a growing body of federal precedent upholding the Fugitive
Slave Act. In reaction, Judge Leavitt's decision repeatedly referred to
duty under federal law: the marshal's obligation to enforce the Act
and the state's obligation not to interfere. The opinion concluded with
an indication that, to Judge Leavitt, Ohio's behavior threatened
nothing short of anarchy:
No judge or other officer of the state or national government, or any
citizen of either, so far as the rights of others are concerned, has a right
to act on his private and individual views of the policy and validity of
laws passed in conformity with the forms of the constitution. Until
repealed or set aside by the adjudication of the proper judicial tribunal,
they must have the force of laws and be obeyed as such. Any other
principle must lead to anarchy in its worst form, and result inevitably
in the speedy overthrow of our institutions.
249
The people of Ohio apparently were unmoved. A year later-the
year of the Dred Scott decision 0-Judge Leavitt faced a more
intransigent display of resistance in the often-cited case, Ex parte
Sifford.2' Once again, Judge Leavitt perceived the matter as a conflict
between federal and state authorities, in which the federal interests
were paramount.z2 In Sifford, federal agents had arrested four people
on warrants charging that they had aided and abetted the escape of a
fugitive slave and obstructed federal officers in the execution of the
Fugitive Slave Act. A Champaign County probate judge issued a writ
of habeas corpus directed at the federal officers, and the Clark County
sheriff decided to serve it while the officers were transporting the
prisoners through his territory. His idea of serving the writ, however,
249. Robinson, 20 F. Cas. at 969.
250. Although it is difficult to tell, and the case nowhere cites Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), it appears that Sifford was decided some months after the March
6, 1857 reading of the Dred Scott decision.
251. 22 F. Cas. 105 (S.D. Ohio 1857) (No. 12,848). Peller cites Sifford as an example
of relitigation. Peller, supra note 1, at 617.
252. Sifford, 22 F Cas. at 106. Judge Leavitt began his opinion by stating, 'There is
no cause to regret the indulgence which has been extended to counsel, in the presentation
and discussion of this case, or the time, which, for reasons not necessary to be stated, has
elapsed since the hearing commenced.... Every case of conflict between the national and
state authorities casts upon the judge or court called to pass upon it a most responsible duty;
and such cases are the more embarrassing and difficult when the jurisdiction of the judge or
court is challenged, and a decision of that question becomes necessary." Id.
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was "by taking possession of the four prisoners." 3 As Judge Leavitt
dryly noted, the sheriff was "fully aware that the writ could not be
served without bringing the authorities of the United States and the
state of Ohio into direct collision, and that the issue to be settled was
purely one of physical power.
'' 54
The federal officers resisted the attempt to relieve them of their
prisoners and continued on their way. The state officers then swore
out a complaint for assault against the marshals. A "large armed
force" then seized the marshals and rescued their prisoners2 5 The
marshals now found themselves in jail, and after some procedural
wrangling, accused of assault on a sheriff with intent to kill. The Ohio
courts discharged the fugitives pursuant to the state habeas corpus, and
the federal government sought the release of the imprisoned marshals
under the 1833 Act.
Ohio argued that the federal marshals were held under lawful
state process, and accordingly, the federal habeas court lacked
authority to evaluate independently the decision of the court that issued
the warranty 6 Relying on the earlier resistance cases, Judge Leavitt
found that the 1833 Act necessarily encompassed the power to go
behind the return-arguably lacking in the 1789 Act-in support of its
mandate to enforce federal policy over the states.257 As he said:
Now, the point to be inquired into and determined by the judge issuing
the habeas corpus is, whether the act for which the party is imprisoned
has been done in the discharge of official duty, under the authority
contemplated by the provision referred to [the 1833 Act]. But if the
return to the writ, showing an imprisonment, under state process, shuts
out all further inquiry, the act of congress is a dead letter and its
purpose altogether defeated.Y8
253. Id.
254. Il at 110.
255. Id. at 107.
256. Id
257. Id.
258. Id. Judge Leavitt continued, in response to the State's argument that the 1833
Act was limited to the nullification crisis surrounding the Tariff of Abominations:
The occasion of the passage of the act of congress of 1833 has been referred to;
and, it is contended in argument, that it must be limited in its operation to a state
of things similar to that then existing; and was intended only to guard against
nullification, when it appeared in the form of resistance by state authority, to the
revenue laws of the United States. It was doubtless such threatened resistance that
called the law into being. But, it has been permitted to remain on the statute book,
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Without the power to scrutinize the state's version of the facts, "it
is very clear the sovereignty of the United States is liable every day to
be contemned and trampled upon." 9 The federal government would
be at the mercy of "any one, corrupt enough to make a false oath
against an officer of the United States, having charge of offenders
against its laws, to procure their release, and most effectually to
obstruct and nullify the legislation of the Union for the punishment of
crime. '260  In the service of federal supremacy, Judge Leavitt
unconsciously echoed the state judges attempting to limit federal
recruitment fraud and antislavery advocates pleading the cause of free
blacks.
Judge Leavitt did attempt to strike a conciliatory note,26'
minimizing the incursion on state interests represented by the
expanded federal habeas powers. The challenge to regular state
process "does not imply any invasion of the sovereignty of the state,
whose process is thus treated. Nor is it based on any assumption or
claim that a federal court or judge has any jurisdiction to revise or set
aside, the judgments of the courts or magistrates of the state." 262
Instead, the 1833 Act merely continued the court's power "to inquire
into the cause of imprisonment., 263  Nevertheless, contemporaries
understood the issue in starker terms-the respect of one sovereign for
another. The refusal to accept the state's legal process at face value
in full force for upward of twenty-five years. This has not been the result of
accident or inadvertence. It was obvious to the members of congress, and the
statesmen, who have, since the enactment of the law, participated in the affairs of
the country, that it was a wise provision and necessary to meet any subsequent
case of improper interference by a state with the legislation of congress, in matters
pertaining to the national government, and within the range of its exclusive
powers.
Id.
259. Id. at 108.
260. Id. Leavitt attempted to separate the supremacy issue from the more volatile
context of the Fugitive Slave Act, remarking, "It is easy to conceive, how not only the
fugitive-slave law, but the laws for the protection of the post-office department, and laws
punishing the making of spurious coins of the United States, may be defeated in their
salutary operations, if the jurisdiction referred to does not exist." Id.
261. Id. at 112. The occasion for such conciliation was that "[m]uch has been said by
counsel on the importance of the questions involved in this case. The danger of invading the
sovereignty of the state of Ohio has been exhibited in most eloquent and forcible terms; and
the court has been admonished of the fearful results of the exercise of jurisdiction in this
case." Id
262. Id. at 108.
263. Id.
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was not simply an expression of federal supremacy, but of state
limitation as well. Habeas corpus was now a key weapon in the
federal arsenal, and Ohio was on notice that it would be used to
enforce federal supremacy at the cost of state sovereignty.2
4
The line of authority represented by the Fugitive Slave Act cases
filtered into other federal habeas opinions decided before passage of
the 1867 Act. Perhaps the best known of these later cases is United
States ex rel. Roberts v. Jailer.2 65  Roberts was a federal marshal
attempting to arrest a defendant for violating the federal tax laws,
apparently by making moonshine alcohol. When the accused resisted
arrest and attempted to shoot Roberts, the marshal returned fire and
killed him. Roberts was then arrested and indicted for murder under
state process. 2 66 He eventually obtained release under the provisions
of the 1833 Act.
Characterizing the case as a clash between state and federal
authority, the Roberts court notified the state's attorney so that he
could appear to represent the state's interests in the proceeding. 67 His
position provides an interesting insight into the time because the state
attorney argued that the part of Kentucky in which the events took
264. Id. at 112. The court stated,
It is readily conceded that a federal judge or court should tread with cautious steps
upon the line dividing the national and state sovereignties. But it should be
remembered that sovereignty pertains to the government of the United States as
well as to that of the states. The general government within its constitutional
limits is supreme and its action is paramount to any opposing action on the part of
the states. Every right thinking and right hearted American citizen will feel and
admit the obligation resting on him to sustain the just powers of the Union as well
as of the state in which he resides. A proper fealty to both is due from and
demanded of every citizen; and these obligations are neither repugnant or
inconsistent. Upon the just recognition of each depends the existence and
perpetuity of our government.
Id.
265. 26 E Cas. 571 (C.C.D. Ky. 1867) (No. 15,463). Peller cites Roberts as a further
example of relitigation. Peller, supra note 1, at 617 n.202. The case relies heavily on the
analysis in Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7259). In fact,
Roberts demonstrates that the problem before the court is indistinguishable from the issues
presented in the fugitive cases, including Jenkins, Morris, Robinson, and several other
apparently unreported cases. Roberts, 26 F. Cas. at 575. While admitting that the relevant
precedents all arose in the context of the Fugitive Slave Act, the district judge remarked,
"But I suppose no one will assert that the rights of masters to their slaves are higher than the
rights of the government to its revenue; or that the person of an officer when seeking to
arrest a fugitive slave is more sacred than when endeavoring to arrest a criminal." Id. at 576.
266. Id. at 575.
267. Id. at 572.
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place was so disordered that the decedent believed the people at his
house were robbers and not law officers.268 As the court's discussion
indicates, however, the once-disputed question of whether the federal
habeas court had authority to inquire into the circumstances of a
facially regular detention was now settled in favor of the court's broad
evidentiary powers.
On the wider issue of federal habeas corpus relief for state
prisoners the court was more cautious: The district judge limited the
circumstances in which state prisoners could invoke the federal habeas
remedy to those implicating federal supremacy.269 Accordingly, the
court disclaimed any right to discharge the marshal on the basis of self
defense, even if a state jury would have acquitted him on that
ground.27° Denying any "general supervisory jurisdiction" over the
state courts and persons or property in their custody,271 the court
instead focused on the federal interests involved. The homicide
justifiably occurred in the course of an attempt to make a valid federal
arrest; the marshal was therefore entitled to release.272
In each of these cases in which federal courts ordered habeas
relief to state prisoners, the court focused on governmental interests
and not on the individual rights of the prisoners themselves. Thus,
these decisions give scant comfort to those who would push the
268. Id. at 575.
269. Id. at 576.
270. Id. The court stated, "A jury would probably acquit him on such ground. . . but
I have nothing to do with such an inquiry. It belongs only to the state court. I have only to
inquire whether what he did was done in pursuance of a law and process of the United
States, and so justified, not excused, by that law and process." Id.
271. Id. at 577.
272. Id. The tone of the decision was decidedly more conciliatory toward the state
bench than the fugitive cases:
I have not been induced to arrive at this conclusion [that the prisoner must be
released] by any apprehension that the relator would not, if remanded, have a fair
trial for his alleged offense, in the county of Mercer. I have profound respect for
the learning and integrity of the judge who presides in that circuit, and the
argument and bearing of the able attorney for the commonwealth, before me, are
sufficient assurance of his fairness and honor. If I myself were to be arraigned for
any alleged offense, I know of no tribunal before which I could be tried with fuller
assurance that enlightened and exact justice would be done me than in that in
which these gentlemen are the chief officials. I discharge the relator from no
apprehension that injustice would be done him by a trial in the state court, but
because he has a right to demand his discharge at my hands under the laws of the
United States, which I am bound to administer.
[Vol. 70:1
1995] HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE PRISONERS 59
pedigree of a due process-oriented, broad habeas remedy before the
passage of the 1866 Habeas Act.
VI. THE RETORIC OF HABEAS CoRpus: MI=ARY DEENTION
CASES DECIDED AFER LINCOLN SUSPENDED THE PRIVILEGE OF
HABEAS CoRPuS
Every story deserves an epilogue-at least if the climax leaves
important questions unanswered. And so it is with the story of the
development of federal habeas corpus before the Civil War. The
decisions that actually expanded the reach of federal habeas corpus are
workmanlike, narrowly written, and almost deliberately colorless. Yet,
advocates of the broadest historical reading of habeas corpus have
pointed to fervid rhetoric in which federal courts claim that the writ
was and remained the guardian of traditional due process rights; the
same advocates cite these decisions as evidence of frequent relitigation
of final judgments in order to reach due process violations embedded
in the trial-court record.273 If courts were as constrained in issuing the
writ as the preceding discussion has shown, then the question is where
did this rhetoric come from and how is it to be understood?
In fact, all the cases cited 27 4 -and a few with similar language
that the legal literature has generally overlooked-were decided after
April of 1861, after open hostilities between the Union and the
Confederacy had begun.275 The timing is critical. By April 27, 1861,
the Lincoln administration had suspended the writ of habeas corpus to
protect the military supply line between Philadelphia and the capital;
on May 10, it suspended the writ in Florida; on October 14, the
administration extended the northward suspension of the writ as far as
Maine.2 76 At the same time, the administration took the position that
273. Peller, supra note 1, at 612-13.
274. It should be noted that Peller cited only one case directly in support of his claim
that "lower federal courts routinely permitted federal prisoners to relitigate their due process
claims," and that any lower federal court could exercise the traditional power of habeas
review and release any federal prisoner held in violation of the Due Process Clause-
namely, In re MacDonald, 16 F. Cas. 17 (E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8751), a case with limited
precedential value. Peller, supra note 1, at 612-18.
275. The firing on Fort Sumter, the symbolic act that began the war, took place on
April 14, 1861. NEELY, supra note 20, at 4.
276. Id. at 8-14.
TULANE LAW REVIEW
habeas corpus no longer applied in the territories in rebellion because
they had abrogated their rights under the Constitution.277
As the war continued, the administration imposed further
limitations on habeas corpus. In particular, in the late summer and fall
of 1862-ironically enough, at the same time it was readying the
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation 278-the Lincoln admini-
stration announced that all persons resisting the draft, discouraging
enlistment, or guilty of any disloyal practice would be subject to
martial law, tried by military courts, and denied the writ of habeas
corpus.
Contemporaries considered Lincoln's actions a dangerous
usurpation of power by the executive, an unconstitutional series of acts
that jeopardized the civil liberties of ordinary citizens.279 In fact, not
until March 3, 1863 did Congress authorize the executive to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus, setting to rest that aspect of the
controversy.280  The irony is that the decisions commonly cited for
their broad construction of habeas corpus were issued by courts who
did not have habeas powers or feared losing them in a country in the
middle of a civil war. What is more, the opinions appeared to have
been written largely by judges who were out of sympathy with
277. Id. at 10. Neely also describes a period of aggressive arrests of persons
suspected of rebel sympathies, beginning in late 1861 and trailing off by 1863, despite the
famous Vallandingham arrest. Id. at 18-23.
278. The Emancipation Proclamation was issued on September 22, 1862, five days
after the battle of Antietam. It stated that it would free all slaves behind rebel lines as of
January 1, 1863. On New Year's Day, Lincoln signed the final Emancipation Proclamation,
making good the promise of three months earlier. MCPERSON, supra note 84, at 557-58,
563.
279. The main issue was whether the executive branch could suspend the writ without
prior congressional authorization. Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Exparte Merryman, 17
F. Cas. 144, 147-53 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487), although otherwise suspect (see infra
note 296), testified to the'disquiet of the legal community in the face of Lincoln's actions.
After discussing Lincoln's decision to suspend the writ, the Chief Justice stated,
I can only say that if the authority which the constitution has confided to
the judiciary department and judicial officers, may thus, upon any pretext or under
any circumstances, be usurped by the military power... the people of the United
States are no longer living under a government of laws, but every citizen holds
life, liberty and property at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose
military district he may happen to be found.
Meryman, 17 R Cas. at 152; see LINcOLN THE WAR PRESIDENT THE GETYSBURG
LECTuRES 156 (Gabor Boritt ed., 1992); NEELY, supra note 20, at 7-9; JAMES G. RANDALL,
CONSTTUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LiNcoLN 118-39 (2d ed. 1964).
280. NEELY, supra note 20, at 202.
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Lincoln's conduct of the war. Under these circumstances, the
decisions have limited value in determining the actual contours of the
habeas remedy.
Consider, for example, the heavily cited In re McDonald,28" ' an
opinion issued by Judge Samuel Treat of the district court for the
Eastern District of Missouri in the first half of May 1861. Previously
unremarked in the legal literature, the background of McDonald is
instructive. Both a slave and a border state, Missouri had substantial
unionist sympathy as well as a substantial Confederate presence, and,
by the spring of 1861, much of its elected government had decamped
to join the Confederacy. Although not yet officially under martial
law-the writ of habeas corpus was still formally in place-the state
was extremely unsettled and military forces for both sides were
present.0 2 Judge Treat himself had been influential in Missouri
Democratic politics for many years, opposing the various parties that
coalesced into the pro-Lincoln Republicans.283 In this turbulent
atmosphere McDonald was decided.
On May 10, 1861, Union Captain Nathaniel P. Lyon captured a
large body of Missouri militiamen--Confederate sympathizers-at
Camp Jackson, where they were supposedly poised to capture the
federal arsenal at St. Louis for the Confederacy.214 Shortly afterward,
Judge Treat issued a writ of habeas corpus, releasing one of the
prisoners, Captain Emmett McDonald. General William S. Haney,
the area's Union commander responded, saying that despite his desire
"to sustain the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the
State of Missouri .... I must take to what I am compelled to regard as
the higher law, even [if] by so doing, my conduct shall have the
281. 16 F. Cas. 17 (E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8751). This is the case most heavily relied
on by Peller for his claim that habeas corpus was a broad due process-oriented remedy
during the nineteenth century. Peller, supra note 1, at 612-16.
282. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, supra note 84, at 290-94 (describing divided allegiances
in Missouri at the outbreak of the War).
283. Judge Treat was born in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1815 and died in
Rochester, New York in 1902. He moved to St. Louis in 1841 and became active in
Democratic politics, serving as judge of the St. Louis Court of Common Pleas from 1849 to
1857. He was appointed to the federal court in 1857 by the Democratic Buchanan
administration, which had been elected largely by southern and northern conciliationists'
votes.
284. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, supra note 84, at 290-92 (describing the role of Lyon in
the Missouri campaign; the federal arsenal at St. Louis contained 60,000 muskets and other
arms, making it the largest in the slave states).
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appearance of coming in conflict with the forms of law."2 5 In other
words, General Harney refused to obey because the area was under
rebellion and was de facto, if not de jure, under martial law.
The opinion of the district court reflects this refusal in the politer
terms of legal argument. Counsel for the military apparently demurred
to the writ, arguing that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain a petition for habeas corpus when the prisoner was not
confined by any formal commitment. McDonald, for his part,
maintained that he was entitled to the writ because he was held by
color of the authority of the United States.28 6 The first thing to notice,
of course, is that McDonald never claimed to be held by virtue of
judicial process-not even that of a military tribunal-so that the issue
of relitigation did not even come up in the case.
These circumstances explain Judge Treat's oddly extended
discussion of the underpinnings of the federal habeas power, as well as
the strength of his rhetoric. Taking note of the situation in which he
found himself, Judge Treat admiringly quoted an earlier judge who
faced a petition for habeas corpus from a prisoner accused of
fomenting rebellion against the federal government:
In times like these, when the public mind is agitated-when wars and
rumors of wars, plots, conspiracies and treasons excite alarm--it is the
duty of a court to be peculiarly watchful, lest the public feeling should
reach the seat of justice, and thereby precedents be established which
may become the ready tools of faction in times more disastrous. The
worst of precedents may be established from the best of motives. We
ought to be upon our guard, lest our zeal for the public interest lead us
to overstep the bounds of the law and the constitution; for, although we
may thereby bring one criminal to punishment, we may furnish the
means by which a hundred innocent persons may suffer. The
constitution was made for times of commotion. In the calm of peace
and prosperity, there is seldom great injustice. Dangerous precedents
occur in dangerous times. It then becomes the duty of the judiciary
calmly to poise the scales of justice, unmoved by the arm of power,
undisturbed by the clamor of the multitude.28
7
285. NEELY, supra note 20, at 32 (quoting Harney and suggesting that this informal
suspension of the writ would have troubled the Lincoln administration, had the matter come
to its attention).
286. In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 17, 18 (E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8751).
287. See id. at 19 (quoting with admiration Judge Cranch's opinion in the circuit
court case of United States v. Bollman). Bollnan involved a petition for habeas corpus from
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Judge Treat saw himself faced with nothing less than the collapse of
national law, and with it, the civil rights of citizens. Emmett
McDonald, whose fate is obscured by the rhetoric, was never released.
On the merits, Judge Treat upheld his jurisdiction both to resolve
the jurisdictional issue itself and to hear the petition, reasoning that
federal courts in exercise of their authority under the 1789 Judiciary
Act had traditionally reached military detentions.288 Judge Treat then
discussed at length the history of the writ,2 89 Supreme Court habeas
case law,29° and state and federal lower-court authority. It is
McDonald, self-consciously decided under difficult circumstances,
that presents one of the relatively few291 extended judicial discussions
in the federal case law linking habeas corpus not only with Magna
Charta and the rights of Englishmen, but with "due process," as
defined by the entire common-law tradition.292
participants in Aaron Burr's planned rebellion against the federal government. United
States v. BolIman, 24 F Cas. 1189, 1192 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622).
288. McDonald, 16 F. Cas. at 21.
289. The case contains an extended, if unlikely, discussion of the history of the 1757
amendments to the English Act of 1679 in order to demonstrate that the Framers intended
that the writ reach noncriminal detentions both in and outside of court sessions. McDonald,
16 F. Cas. at 22-23.
290. Id. at 23. McDonald also provided an interesting interpretation of the early
Supreme Court decisions regarding habeas corpus. Because the Supreme Court believed
that the writ was not part of its original jurisdiction, it construed habeas corpus as revisory or
appellate in nature. As a result, the court could only issue the writ when the detention was by
a court over which the Supreme Court had appellate power--"[i]t followed logically that it
could not issue the writ where there was no commitment by any court; for there would then
be no action of a court over which it had appellate jurisdiction, which could come before it
for revision." Id.
291. It is difficult to prove a negative, but there does not appear to be any federal
decision similar in extent and tone before McDonald. Moreover, there are a number of
opinions in which such language might have been appropriate. See, e.g., Ex parte Des
Rochers, 7 F Cas. 537 (C.C.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 3824). Des Rochers brought a petition on
behalf of David S. Terry, a judge of the California Supreme Court, who was kidnapped to
prevent him from fulfilling his judicial duties. The opinion, by Judge McAllister, described
the writ as a remedy for every illegal imprisonment, including those by private persons. Id.
at 537-38. Although Des Rochers stressed the importance of the writ's remedial powers, it
also expounded at length on the limited federal power to issue the writ, including the
restriction that the federal courts not issue the writ to prisoners held by state authorities.
Despite this extended discussion, the Des Rochers court did not engage in the type of rights
or due process talk attributed to McDonald. Id. at 538-39.
292. McDonald, 16 R Cas. at 21. The critical passage on which so much has been
made to rest is as follows:
The power granted to the United States courts by that act [the Judiciary Act
of 1789] is as broad as if it read: they "shall have power to issue the writs of scire
facias and habeas corpus agreeable to the principles and usages of law"--
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In elaborating its account of habeas corpus, McDonald relied
heavily on the habeas cases decided in the context of state resistance to
the Fugitive Slave Act.293  These cases obviously recommended
themselves to a federal court sitting in a slave state on the verge of
secession because they showed that the federal government would
enforce the rights of slaveholders. 294 As discussed in the previous
section, these cases, pled under the 1833 Act-and not under the 1789
Act invoked in McDonald-also entailed the most extensive judicial
view of federal habeas powers to be found in the antebellum period.
But, it should be noted, their expansiveness drew from their different
statutory foundation and purpose-namely, the enforcement of federal
supremacy. By freeing those jailed on state process for enforcing the
Fugitive Slave Act, habeas corpus preserved the rule of federal law
principles and usages as well understood as the meaning of the words "due
process of law" in the fifth amendment to the constitution. And so on the Trial of
Burr [Case No. 14,693], Chief Justice Marshall held: "The principles and usages
of law mean those general principles and usages which are to be found, not in the
legislative acts of any particular state, but in that generally recognized and long
established law which forms the substratum of all the laws of every state."
Id.
293. Id. at 27-30. Among the cases discussed is Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7259). McDonald also contains an extended discussion of United
States ex reL Wheeler v. Williamson, 28 R Cas. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 16,725), in which
the "pure and able" Judge Kane "did not hesitate about what his official duty demanded"
and issued the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a petitioner whose slaves had been seized
by a mob while they were traveling through Philadelphia. McDonald, 16 F Cas. at 27.
When the respondent, who was believed to be sheltering the fugitives, made an evasive
return, Judge Kane imprisoned him for contempt. In this somewhat unattractive context,
Judge Kane declared the following:
Through the long series of political struggles which gave form to the British
constitution, it [habeas corpus] was claimed as the birthright of every Englishman,
and our ancestors brought it with them as such to this country. At the common
law it issued whenever a citizen was denied the exercise of his personal liberty, or
was deprived of his rightful control over any member of his household, his wife,
his child, his ward, or his servant. It issued from the courts of the sovereign, and,
in his name, at the instance of any one who invoked it, either for himself or
another. It commanded, almost in the words of the Roman edict, "de libero
homine exhibendo," that the party under detention should be produced before the
court, there to await its decree.
Id. at 29-30 (quoting Williamson, 28 F Cas. at 688).
294. In this regard, it is worth noting that General Fremont issued a proclamation on
August 30, 1861 that attempted to free the slaves of Missouri rebels and threatened to
execute Missourians found in arms against the United States. President Lincoln revoked the
proclamation. NEELY, supra note 20, at 34.
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against the states' challenge to federally protected property rights and
upheld the authority of the federal courts.295
McDonald was a western forerunner of Ex parte Merryman.
296
Because of its focus on whether the President could suspend the writ
without an act of Congress 297 or delegate the suspension power in the
military,298 Merryman is not generally known for its expansive rhetoric
295. The citations to the fugitive cases in McDonald clearly demonstrate that this-
and not sympathy with the slaves-was the court's concern. McDonald, 16 F. Cas. at 27-28.
Taken in this light, the McDonald court's discussion of due process has a different flavor
from that given it by Peller, albeit one that shows the emphasis on federal supremacy in
habeas cases decided at mid-century. See Peller, supra note 1, at 616.
296. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). As Don Fehrenbacher has noted,
there is a rather remarkable irony lurking behind Merryman. Whatever Chief Justice
Taney's views regarding the legality or advisability of an executive suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, by 1861 the Chief Justice was firmly entrenched in his Southern sympathies.
Nevertheless, he was unable to resign his position as Chief Justice because he depended on
the salary and was the sole support of his two daughters, one of whom was a semi-invalid.
Thus, until 1864, when Taney died, the Union had a Confederate sympathizer for its Chief
Justice. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 148, at 286-88, 295-98.
The facts of Merryman closely mirror those in McDonald, save that the arrest took
place in Maryland on May 25, 1861, after the Lincoln administration had issued an order
suspending the writ of habeas corpus north from the capital to Philadelphia. Merryman was
clearly a Confederate sympathizer, and to that extent his arrest and detention was warranted,
considering that Maryland authorities had responded to the firing on Fort Sumter by burning
one set of rail bridges linking Washington with the north. After his arrest, military
authorities confined Merryman to Fort McHenry. Justice Taney, sitting on circuit, issued a
writ of habeas corpus on his behalf. The military authorities refused to produce Merryman
without even denying the facts in the petition.
Merryman apparently encouraged anti-Lincoln critics, particularly in the midwest and
upper midwest, to resort to the courts to defend themselves and spawned a series of state law
habeas corpus cases in the midwest. See FRANK L. KLEMENT, THE CoPPERHEADs IN THE
MIDDLE WEST 67-72 (1960) (containing a full description of a number of these cases and the
controversies that surrounded them). "Copperhead" was an epithet, apparently used as early
as the fall of 1861 by Ohio Republicans to liken antiwar Democrats to the venomous snake
of that name. Id. at 1-4. By the fall of 1862, the term had gained wide usage. See, e.g.,
MCPHERSON, supra note 84, at 494 n.8 (and sources cited therein).
297. Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149-50.
298. Id. at 150. As Chief Justice Taney said,
[A] military officer, residing in Pennsylvania, issues an order to arrest a
citizen of Maryland, upon vague and indefinite charges, without any proof, so far
as appears; under this order, his house is entered in the night, he is seized as a
prisoner, and conveyed to Fort McHenry, and there kept in close confinement; and
when a habeas corpus is served on the commanding officer, requiring him to
produce the prisoner before a justice of the supreme court, in order that he may
examine into the legality of the imprisonment, the answer of the officer, is that he
is authorized by the president to suspend the writ of habeas corpus at his
discretion, and in the exercise of that discretion, suspends it in this case ....
Id. at 147-48.
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describing the writ. Nevertheless, to underscore the outrage of
Lincoln's executive suspension, Justice Taney reviewed the history of
habeas corpus and its central role in maintaining civil liberties.299
Justice Taney linked the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment-the right to "due process of law"-with its
enforcement mechanism, the writ of habeas corpus.3t ° Later in the
opinion, he returned to the theme, listing the constitutional guarantees
that were violated by the military detention of the civilian Merryman:
his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and
seizure, Fifth Amendment right to due process, and his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial, all of which, like the writ of habeas
corpus, were "suspended ... by a military order, supported by force of
arms."301  But fulminate as he might, Justice Taney was forced to
admit that "I have exercised all the power which the constitution and
laws confer upon me, but that power has been resisted by a force too
strong for me to overcome. 30 2 The military refused to produce
Merryman or to justify the detention. All that Justice Taney could do
was to direct the record of the case be sent to the President as an
embittered rebuke.303
The fervency with which the courts defended the writ of habeas
corpus escalated as their power to issue it became, as a practical
matter, more restricted. In the first place, judicial objection solidified
Lincoln's unilateral suspension of the writ. In the second, in 1862,
299. E.g., id. at 150-51. ("The most exciting contests between the crown and the
people of England, from the time of Magna Charta, were in relation to the privilege of this
writ, and they continued until the passage of the statute of 31 Car. II., commonly known as
the great habeas corpus act.").
300. Id. at 149. In speaking of the presidency's restricted powers, Taney wrote,
[The President] is not empowered to arrest any one charged with an offence
against the United States, and whom he may, from the evidence before him,
believe to be guilty; nor can he authorize any officer, civil or military, to exercise
this power, for the fifth article of the amendments to the constitution expressly
provides that no person "shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law"-that is, judicial process.
Id. In the next paragraph, Chief Justice Taney discussed habeas corpus as the ordinary
remedy for illegal detentions, as well as raising the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial
in criminal matters. Id.
301. Id. at 152.
302. Id. at 153.
303. Id. ("It will then remain for that high officer, in fulfilment [sic] of his
constitutional obligation to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' to determine
what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be respected and
enforced.").
[Vol. 70:1
1995] HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE PRISONERS 67
Lincoln raised the stakes when he formally authorized both military
detention and trial without access to habeas corpus for disloyal actions
behind Union lines. In this situation, courts were both impotent and
outraged, and their language elevated the power of the writ at the same
time that they were unable to enforce their orders.
For example, after Lincoln's order of August 8, 1862, pacifist
Campbellite preacher Judson D. Benedict of Aurora, New York, was
arrested for discouraging enlistment.3 4  Benedict's lawyers
unsuccessfully tried to obtain a writ from the New York Supreme
Court. Rebuffed, they turned to Judge Nathan K. Hall of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York, a former
law partner of Millard Fillmore, who had served as Postmaster
General in Fillmore's Whig cabinet for two years, until his 1852
appointment to the federal bench.305 There, in Ex parte Benedict,306
they received sympathy, favorable language,307 and even a writ-but
all to no avail.
Before the writ could be served on his jailer, Benedict was
spirited out of the district. Counsel then requested that the court issue
an order discharging Benedict from custody and punishing the jailer
for contempt.30 8 As to the first request, the court held that its process
could not run beyond its district and that it was unable to release the
prisoner without first having him brought into court.3' As to the
second, the court found it unfair to subject the marshal to contempt
sanctions for a situation not of his own making.310 Moreover, Judge
Hall suggested that a contempt citation presented other problems:
304. Exparte Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 160 (N.D.N.Y 1862) (No. 1292).
305. NEELY, supra note 20, at 202. Of course, this placed Hall in the Cabinet at the
time that Fillmore, a die-hard unionist who believed in placating the South, signed the
Fugitive Slave Act and the rest of the legislation that made up the Compromise of 1850,
legislation that was passed during the term of the recently deceased Zachary Taylor.
Fillmore was so tarred by his signing of the Fugitive Slave Act that he lost the 1852 Whig
nomination to General Winfield Scott, who, in turn, lost the general election to Democrat
Franidin Pierce. Fillmore-and presumably Hall-was extremely critical of Lincoln's
conduct of the war.
306. 3 F. Cas. 159.
307. NEELY, supra note 20, at 202 n.49. Hall's opinion, supported with other
documents, was widely circulated as a pamphlet, exhausting two editions of 10,000 and
8,000 each. Id. This tends to support the view that Hall remained closely allied with the
Fillmore interests at the time he issued the decision.
308. Benedict, 3 F. Cas. at 160.
309. Id. at 172.
310. Id. at 175.
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Because the process for contempt ran in the President's name, there
was serious question about the court's authority to issue it under the
circumstances.31 The court had little recourse but to publish an angry
advisory opinion.
The background of Benedict demonstrates the unsettled nature of
war times, even well behind Union lines. According to Judge Hall, the
arresting officer stated that the authority for Benedict's detention was a
"slip cut from a newspaper, purporting to contain a copy of an order of
the war department."3 2 Benedict countered that he was entitled to
release because he was not detained "by virtue of any process of any
kind or description," and because, in any event, he was innocent of any
disloyalty.31
3
On these facts, Judge Hall wrote, he would have granted the writ
"at once,"314 but for the fact that he ran across a newspaper copy of a
second order-this one issued by the President-dated the same day as
the first suspending the privilege of habeas corpus for all persons
suspected of disloyal acts.31 5 Judge Hall expressed dismay that the
President's order extended the power of arbitrary arrest to "every
policeman and military officer" in the loyal states and at the same time
eliminated all remedy for such a detention.1 6
Although Judge Hall's opinion primarily argues that the writ
could only be suspended by an act of Congress, he also felt compelled
to explain the importance of this issue. This led him to a substantial
discussion of the role of habeas corpus as a protector of personal
liberty against government overreaching and as a guarantor of a
311. Id. at 171-76.
312. Id. at 160.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 161.
315. Id.
316. As the court stated:
[T]he second order, in respect to the cases within it, extends the power [of
arrest] to all deputy marshals and all military officers of the United States, and to
all police authorities. These officers, many thousands in number, and of every
grade of intelligence, are scattered over every portion of our country. To all of
these arbitrary powers of arrest, without warrant, and without any prior legal
inquiry, and without the slightest preliminary proof of guilt, is assumed to be
given.
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government of laws. 17 Thus, Judge Hall reminded his readers of the
lessons of history, quoting at length from Blackstone's account of the
Petition of Right and the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,
and concluding on the ominous note that, as a result of Charles's
violation of the rights of Englishmen, "his head was brought to the
block by his oppressed and indignant people." '318
Perhaps more interesting is the court's explicit linking of the
withdrawal of all remedy for detention under the War Department
order, the possibility of forced military service, and the constitutional
right of due process:
Was it intended, then, that every policeman and every military officer
throughout the loyal states, and in localities far removed from the seat
of military operations, should be authorized to arrest and imprison any
citizen, and that if, on taking the party into custody ... such officer
should declare that he made the arrest by virtue of the [War
Department order] ... ,he could keep him in prison, or in his own
custody, or compel him to enter the military service, and also require
all judicial officers, when the prisoner or his friends applied for a writ
of habeas corpus, that the facts of the case might be judicially
ascertained and the question of the legality of his arrest and detention
considered, to say, "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended, and you can have no relief?" Is every man supposed to be
subject to militia duty, who has left or shall leave his county since the
8th of August last, and prior to the unknown day in the future when a
draft is to be made.., to be punished by being forced into the military
service for nine months, without any hearing, without any opportunity
to show that he is exempt from militia duty, when the constitution
317. Id. at 165-71. The court described the Act of 1679 as "another Magna Charta of
the kingdom," id. at 164, and quoted at length from, among other things, Chief Justice
Taney's opinion in Merryman. Id. at 166-68. It is also indicative of wartime conditions that
the district judge had difficulty determining whether Congress had passed an act authorizing
the President to suspend habeas corpus:
When the counsel for the petitioner, some days since, suggested that he
desired to apply for a writ of habeas corpus to bring up the body of the petitioner,
I had the impression that congress, at its last session, had passed an act
authorizing the president to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and that he had
sanctioned the order of the war department under such authority. If this had been
the case, I should have held it to be my duty to refuse a writ, in a case within the
scope of the law of congress, and the order of the president; but having, since that
suggestion was made, received the acts of the last session, I find that I was
mistaken, and that congress has passed no law on this subject.
Id. at 165.
318. Id.
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provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law?
319
Here the court described habeas corpus as the remedy for due process
violations. But in its proper context, those violations are military
detentions of noncombatant civilians. Moreover, the opinion does not
even intimate a right to relitigate the final determination of a judicial
body of competent jurisdiction. Rather, the court focused on
preventing government abuse either as detention without a hearing or
presumably, detention on the finding of a military court without
jurisdiction over the civilian detainee.320
Of the many other cases of military detentions, two others serve
to round out the picture of courts employing florid rhetoric which,
nevertheless, does not support a broad use of the habeas remedy. In Ex
parte Field, for example, a Vermont federal circuit court faced a
petitioner who was arrested for disloyalty by a federal marshal on the
basis of an order from the Secretary of State.321 Although the court
found that Field was entitled to the writ at the time he originally
petitioned the court, the intervening suspension of the court's habeas
powers-and the marshal's contumacious delay in producing his
prisoner-had robbed Field of a remedy.322 Frustrated, the court's
historical fancy turned to the rhetoric of the Revolutionary period-the
British use of general warrants and the controversy surrounding the
publication of North Briton No. 45-as it tied the "liberty of the
kingdom" to a remedy for arbitrary imprisonment.
Likewise, the case of William Winder, arrested for opposition to
the federal government, led a federal court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus. 324 Here, however, the federal marshal refused to serve the writ,
and a local deputy sheriff who attempted service was met by a party of
fifty armed men, all intent on preventing him from delivering the
document to the commanding officer of the facility where Winder was
319. Id. at 161.
320. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 107-31 (1866) (considering the
validity of the executive suspension of the writ of habeas corpus after it was too late to assist
the wartime detainees).
321. Exparte Field, 9 E Cas. 1 (C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4761).
322. Id. at 3.
323. Id. at 4.
324. In re Winder, 30 F Cas. 288,294 (C.C.D. Mass. 1862) (No. 17,867).
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held.32 In a perverse way, this shows the esteem in which the writ of
habeas corpus was held; however, it also demonstrates the writ's
limitations. As the district judge stated,
The court deeply regrets that officers of the United States should
obstruct process out of a court of the United States, especially this
process. But those officers are at present beyond the control of the law,
and the court has not the command of the physical force needful to
effect a service of this writ at the present time.326
Instead, like Justice Taney, the judge directed that the writ be placed on
file to be served when practicable.327
Although the language of these decisions-and others like
them-is stirring to twentieth century sensibilities, the cases
themselves do not bear out a broad reading of habeas corpus powers.
In reality, they involve a fairly pedestrian aspect of the core habeas
function, protecting citizens against arbitrary imprisonment by the
executive branch. They are interesting largely because the wartime
measures of the Lincoln administration threatened that function.
Despite the courts' outrage at their impotence-real or
impending-these cases occupy a fundamentally ambivalent posture.
A nation at war with itself, motivated by revulsion at slavery, was
attempting to contain the disunionists within its midst. On the one
hand, stifling dissent is contrary to the constitutional tradition of free
speech and civil liberties, particularly when done under color of
325. Id. at 289-91. Winder was arrested in September, 1862, in Philadelphia on a
charge of conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States. Although those
charges were dropped, Winder was then committed to the custody of a United States marshal
by order of what purported to be a telegram sent by the Secretary of War and transferred first
to New York and then to Fort Warren, near Boston. At no time, according to his petition,
did Winder see any formal charges against him, the Secretary of War denied all knowledge
of the telegram order, and not until Winder had been incarcerated for eight months did he
learn that the cause of his imprisonment was "his correspondence and his writings for the
newspapers." Id. at 291.
The Massachusetts district court agreed that this was a proper occasion to issue a writ
of habeas corpus and put the government to the requirement of making a return and
producing Winder's person. Id at 294. Unfortunately, the United States marshal refused to
serve the writ, leaving the matter to a local deputy sheriff. The military authorities refused to
permit the sheriff aboard the regular boat going to Fort Warren, and when the resourceful
officer hired a sail boat, he was met on shore by a party of fifty armed men, all with the
express intention of preventing him from serving the commanding officer with the writ.
Accordingly, Winder remained in military prison for the duration. Id.
326. Id. at 294.
327. Id.
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summary military authority; on the other, the disunionist cause was
hardly attractive, linked as it was with support for slavery. The
modem reader would be ill-advised to draw any clear lessons
regarding the nature of the habeas corpus remedy from these cases.
Rather, they illustrate all too plainly the painful choices of wartime.
VII. CONCLUSION
Indeed, what lesson can we draw from the strange transformation
of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners from a weapon against the
poor and oppressed into what its partisans argue is a weapon on behalf
of the poor and oppressed? Or, for that matter, what can we learn from
the more general expansion of habeas powers in the nineteenth
century? First, the primary engine for the growth of habeas corpus in
both the state and the federal courts was not individual rights-as it is
now-but the interests of the respective governments and their mutual
fear of overreaching. Second, from this jockeying between state and
federal spheres emerges a fluid and unsettled picture of federalism in
the early decades of the nineteenth century.
The states viewed themselves as repositories of common-law
values and powers. The expansion of their habeas corpus jurisdiction
took place first in reaction to federal military abuses and only later in
reaction to unpopular federal policies regarding the rendition of
fugitive slaves. In the federal system, the nationalist understanding of
habeas corpus powered expansion during the late antebellum period as
part of a general trend toward nationalist and centralizing policies
aimed at offsetting the growth of sectionalism. In both state and
federal courts, the ability to contradict the facts in the return developed
as a weapon to challenge the authority of a coordinate system of
government. The growth of this power signaled an erosion of
deference to other repositories of governmental authority.
The story of the growth of antebellum habeas corpus has another
lesson, beyond its implications for the development of federalism. It
shows that mining the past for answers to modem questions is a risky
business at best. Federal courts did seek to impose federal supremacy
on state courts through habeas corpus, but not in the cases that
partisans of extensive federal review generally discuss, and certainly
not in a context that they-or almost anyone else-would care to
claim as their ancestry. The final lesson, then, is that the past has a
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way of playing tricks on all of us, particularly when we use it to claim
the moral high ground.

